On 30 October, President Trump commented that the United States could resume nuclear testing. On 2 November, the US Secretary of State for Energy, Chris Wright, clarified that this would involve subcritical systems tests and non-nuclear explosions, sanctioned under the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). On 5 November, President Putin issued instructions for proposals on the possible start of work on the preparation of nuclear weapons tests. These events have reopened questions about the role of nuclear testing.
The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) are closely linked, and developments affecting one can influence perceptions of the other. We asked members of our Network to reflect on how changes in testing policies, or even perceptions of such changes, might impact European approaches to security, transatlantic unity, and/or the broader global non-proliferation and arms control regime, particularly given new signalling by Russia?
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“An escalation between major powers led by unpredictable political leaders could be a recipe for disaster. All stakeholders should do their utmost to prevent such a scenario”
Ahmet Uzumcu, Turkey
Former Director General of the Organisation for th Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and Career Diplomat.
Why would one test a weapon? The answer would normally be “to measure its effectiveness”, “to assess the impact of topographic and climatic conditions upon its effectiveness”, “to evaluate its potential effects on your own troops or people “. These are all military/technical factors.
The devastating effects of nuclear weapons had already been experienced in 1945, in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Over 2000 tests, including atmospheric ones, conducted by nuclear-armed states in the following decades had confirmed the unique destructive power of those weapons, with considerable cost for human beings and the environment. There is no military/technical justification to resume such tests, which could unleash a new wave of nuclear arms race and open vistas for countries aspiring to become nuclear. If the purpose is “demonstration” for intimidation or coercion, the already problematic security environment would become even more complicated.
An escalation between major powers led by unpredictable political leaders could be a recipe for disaster. All stakeholders should do their utmost to prevent such a scenario. Instead, every effort must be made to renew and/or create new international agreements to limit nuclear weapons and to ensure the entry into force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) for a sustainable and verifiable test ban regime.”
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“’European states must not only defend the treaty’s integrity but also encourage renewed engagement within the United States to highlight both the security gains embodied in the CTBT and the enduring costs of nuclear testing”
Jana Baldus, Germany
Policy Fellow and NPT Project Lead, ELN
Trump’s thoughtless remarks on resuming nuclear weapons tests deal another blow to the fragile multilateral disarmament and non-proliferation architecture. With Russia’s process of de-ratifying the CTBT already straining the test-ban regime, any US move toward renewed testing would further weaken it and risk reigniting new arms race dynamics. Such a development would also aggravate the unresolved humanitarian and environmental legacies of past tests and undermine decades of efforts to address them.
For Europe, this moment calls for unity and resolve: a clear, collective reaffirmation of the CTBT’s centrality to international security and multilateral disarmament, and a determination to respond firmly to any steps that might further erode it. European states must not only defend the treaty’s integrity but also encourage renewed engagement within the United States to highlight both the security gains embodied in the CTBT and the enduring costs of nuclear testing – before political posturing undermines one of the most significant pillars of multilateral disarmament and non-proliferation.
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“Conducting any nuclear test would significantly undermine the nuclear taboo and non-proliferation norms, as enshrined in the NPT.”
Jan Hoekema, Netherlands
Chair, Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs, NL
The recent announcements by President Trump and the Secretary for Energy create serious concern. This might be a step to undermine the broad consensus on the taboo on nuclear testing as contained in the CTBT.
Of course, we all know that the adherence of three key nuclear powers (the US, China, and Russia) vary in terms of ratification. However, there has been a core agreement that testing would not occur. Conducting any nuclear test would significantly undermine the nuclear taboo and non-proliferation norms, as enshrined in the NPT.
After the ‘de-ratification’ by Moscow, these statements are another serious blow to the already weakened nuclear arms control structures.
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“Reports that President Putin has now asked his government to prepare response options make clear that ambiguity itself can generate instability. Allies and adversaries respond to signals, not intentions.”
Sahil Shah, UK/US
Former Outreach and Policy Consultant to the Executive Secretary of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO)
President Trump’s social media musings that the United States will resume nuclear testing — and his subsequent doubling down on these remarks — risk accelerating the already ongoing arms race between major world powers. Reports that President Putin has now asked his government to prepare response options make clear that ambiguity itself can generate instability. Allies and adversaries respond to signals, not intentions.
European partners, therefore, need to make high-level interventions to safeguard the global moratorium on nuclear explosive testing, which has held for decades with the sole exception of North Korea. The indefinite extension of the NPT was inherently tied to the CTBT, which has become a victim of its own success: it steadily upholds the non-proliferation regime while remaining in a state of legal limbo without entry into force. Any move away from the Treaty’s zero-yield standard would be a slippery slope and should be avoided.
Such shifts would weaken Europe’s ability to argue that restraint is stabilising and in everyone’s strategic interest. Russia, China, and others could claim justification for their own activities, while non-nuclear states may become irreversibly cynical about disarmament prospects and question their own restraint. To prevent further erosion of arms control, Washington should dispel ambiguity, reaffirm its moratorium, and work with European partners to advance practical test-ban transparency — doubling down on clarity, caution, and dialogue as the surest guarantees of collective security.
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The European Leadership Network itself as an institution holds no formal policy positions. The opinions articulated above represent the views of the authors rather than the European Leadership Network or its members. The ELN aims to encourage debates that will help develop Europe’s capacity to address the pressing foreign, defence, and security policy challenges of our time, to further its charitable purposes.
