Skip to content
Commentary | 3 March 2026

Network reflections: The Iran war – what role should Europe be playing?

Image of Tarja Cronberg

Tarja Cronberg |Former Member of the European Parliament, Distinguished Associate Fellow at SIPRI

Image of Michel Duclos

Michel Duclos |Former French Ambassador; Special Adviser to Institut Montaigne

Iran Network Reflections EU Europe Iran Israel JCPOA Middle East Nuclear Weapons United States Iran Iran
Following the recent US–Israeli strikes on Iran and the subsequent regional escalation, Europe’s response has been mixed. As the conflict widens, we ask members of the ELN Network how they assess Europe’s approach so far and what role European governments should be playing.
________________________________________________________________________________________

“It is extremely difficult to see any role for the EU. The Iranians have lost confidence in the EU as the leader of JCPOA implementation, and the new US Security Strategy considers the EU as an adversary.”

Tarja Cronberg, Finland
ELN Senior Network member and former chair of the European Parliament´s Delegation for Iran (2011-2014)

In 2003, when initiating negotiations on Iran’s nuclear programme, the EU had three goals: to avoid a military intervention, to unite the EU after a UNSC vote on Iraq, and to create a significant power role for itself. “Effective multilateralism” was the way forward. It took 12 years to negotiate a historic deal. Iran would remain non-nuclear, its programme would be limited to civilian uses, and selected sanctions would be removed. The EU would lead the implementation of the deal, the JCPOA.

Two years later, the US exited the deal. To prevent a trans-Atlantic split, the EU neither took action nor clearly criticised the exit. Iran followed the rules of the JCPOA for one more year. After this, Iran reactivated its nuclear programme. The EU criticised Iran and later activated the UN mechanism to reinstate the sanctions.

Today, there is a military intervention, although negotiations between the US and Iran were ongoing. It is extremely difficult to see any role for the EU. The Iranians have lost confidence in the EU as the lead implementer of the JCPOA, and the new US Security Strategy considers the EU an adversary. Israel will hardly turn to the EU for help to restore peace. The EU lost its most significant effort on “effective multilateralism” as bombing is ongoing and regime change is on its way.

________________________________________________________________________________________

“It would be good to see Switzerland, Norway, Ireland, and Spain working closely together as the countries most willing to stand up for international law.”

Jane Kinninmont, UK
ELN Senior Associate Fellow and Chief Executive Officer at the United Nations Association – UK

The US-Israeli attack on Iran is clearly a violation of the UN Charter, and has been condemned by the UN Secretary General, but you wouldn’t know it from listening to most European leaders, with a few honourable exceptions. This is a problem for countries that simultaneously say they stand up for international law and keep mentioning it as a good thing in very general terms, without being able to say what it actually means.

This comes on top of a longstanding problem in which European countries seem unable to unify on the Middle East. There are usually three or four different camps within the EU on contentious Middle East issues, and the problem is compounded by European officials sometimes seeming to freelance and expressing views that aren’t actually mandated by member states. If the EU wants to be a serious geopolitical actor, they need to get over this. The risk is that if they focus on consensus, they end up with generic statements that are the lowest common denominator.

There may be a greater chance of a coherent position among the E3 states, who have a long history of coordinating on Iran. It would also be good to see Switzerland, Norway, Ireland, and Spain working closely together as the countries most willing to stand up for international law, with Switzerland and Norway’s history in mediating and Ireland’s role in supporting the JCPOA and standing up for nuclear disarmament more generally.

________________________________________________________________________________________

Europe has to face the current situation, but it should also plan for the future: what help will it be able to provide for the day after to the Iranian people and potentially bruised neighbours?”

Michel Duclos, France
ELN Senior Network member and Former French Ambassador

Europe was not initially involved in this war of choice initiated by Israel and the US. European countries – including France, contrary to its traditional line – abstained from opposing this breach of international law. But European powers – at least Britain and France, given their commitments in the region – are now, more or less, dragged into the conflict. They have to face the current situation, but they should also plan for the future: what help will they be able to provide for the day after to the Iranian people and potentially bruised neighbours? And more globally, how can they avoid a new gap with the Global South?

________________________________________________________________________________________

“The smartest course now is for Europe to work more closely with regional partners and mediators to advance a diplomatic off-ramp before events spiral further.”

Sahil V. Shah, US
Former ELN Senior Iran Policy Advisor and Policy Fellow

“A civilization that uses its principles for trickery and deceit is a dying civilization.” Aimé Césaire’s warning about selective principles resonates uncomfortably in Europe today.

Europe’s response to the US–Israeli strikes on Iran has been alarmingly inconsistent. While most governments have called for restraint, rhetoric has focused more sharply on Iran’s retaliation than on the strikes that precipitated escalation. Few have clearly addressed the legality or the wisdom of what increasingly resembles a reckless war of choice. For a continent that grounds its foreign policy identity in the defence of international law, that imbalance is consequential. For example, some senior European figures have spoken of the need for a political “transition” in Iran. Language that appears to align with regime change sits uneasily with Europe’s stated commitment to negotiated solutions and sovereign equality.

European interests are not peripheral; they are already implicated. A continued war with Iran — particularly one that draws Europe into kinetic involvement — would cut directly against Europe’s strategic interests. A widening regional war would likely mean higher energy prices, renewed migration pressures, domestic political strain, and the spectre of prolonged instability at a time when Europe is already stretched by war on its own continent.

European governments should press unequivocally for de-escalation, state clearly that the initiating use of force contravenes the UN Charter absent a clear self-defence claim, resist mission creep, and avoid being drawn into offensive operations that expand the conflict. It should be noted, however, that the stalled promise of European “strategic autonomy” — ironically first invoked after the US violation of the 2015 nuclear deal with Iran — has narrowed Europe’s direct leverage and credibility with both Washington and Tehran. The smartest course now is for Europe to work more closely with regional partners and mediators to advance a diplomatic off-ramp before events spiral further.

________________________________________________________________________________________

“Europe continues to rely on functioning multilateral institutions to protect and pursue its own interests. That is why Europeans should oppose this war, which is anathema to a rules-based order.”

Oliver Meier, Germany
ELN Policy and Research Director

For Europe, Israel’s and Donald Trump’s war of choice against Iran is a disaster in many ways. Most of these are of Europeans’ own making. Europeans have rightly criticised Iran for its behaviour. But they failed to clearly say that the Israeli and US attacks violate a key tenet of international law, namely the prohibition of the use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state. This undermines Europe’s credibility as a supporter of a rules-based international order and reinforces the impression that Europeans are blind to violations of international law committed by the Trump administration.

The cacophony of European voices on the war further undermines trustworthiness. For months, Europeans saw this war coming. Yet they failed to prepare a coherent message on what needs to be done in response to the illegal attacks.

For Europeans, the most important thing now is not to get dragged further into the widening war in the region. To be sure, France and the United Kingdom can and must defend allies and assets from Iranian attacks, in line with existing commitments. But the ominous statement by the E3 that they reserve the right to destroy Iran’s capability to fire missiles and drones “at their source” may put them on a slippery slope, which could make them war parties.

Iran and the United States may have an interest in seeing just that happen. Europeans don’t. In the long run, Europe continues to rely on functioning multilateral institutions to protect and pursue its own interests. That is why Europeans should oppose this war, which is anathema to a rules-based order.

________________________________________________________________________________________

The European Leadership Network itself as an institution holds no formal policy positions. The opinions articulated above represent the views of the authors rather than the European Leadership Network or its members. The ELN aims to encourage debates that will help develop Europe’s capacity to address the pressing foreign, defence, and security policy challenges of our time, to further its charitable purposes.