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Commentary | 12 August 2025

Moving beyond condemnation: European nuclear diplomacy in Africa in the wake of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine

The limited criticism of Russia by African countries in its war against Ukraine has generated much controversy in Europe. Many European countries wish for a stronger condemnation of Russia’s aggression and a clearer positioning by African countries, despite the difficult position that some African countries find themselves in because of their existing economic cooperation with Russia. Some also expect a unified stance from African countries, even though Africa is a continent of 54 diverse sovereign nations, each with its own geopolitical interests, historical ties, and economic dependencies. While Africa’s historic non-alignment posture partly explains its neutrality, Russia’s growing role as a partner in Africa’s nuclear energy development is a direct strategic lever also shaping Africa’s neutrality: if African countries jeopardise this partnership by taking a stance against Russia on Ukraine, they risk undermining their own developmental ambitions. Thus, the degree of condemnation of Russia’s invasion and the positioning of individual African countries could vary, albeit many maintain a general non-aligned posture. If European countries want to foster a more vocal Africa in European security affairs, European countries must provide African countries with convincing reasons to do so – and cooperation on peaceful uses of nuclear energy represents a vital opportunity.

Strategic reasons for cooperation

Critics may argue that while spending significantly on wars that threaten their security, such as the conflict in Ukraine, European countries lack the bandwidth to engage in nuclear energy development in Africa, which doesn’t directly improve European stability. However, this perspective overlooks the strategic value of long-term partnership building.

If European countries want to foster a more vocal Africa in European security affairs, European countries must provide African countries with convincing reasons to do so - and cooperation on peaceful uses of nuclear energy represents a vital opportunity. Daniel Ajudeonu

If African countries begin to view Europe as a genuine long-term partner in nuclear energy development—rather than another external power seeking extractive relationships—African countries will become invested in European interests that enhance economic stability and prosperity. This investment could thus prompt more active African participation in European priorities, including support for resolving conflicts like the war in Ukraine. Through a mutually beneficial nuclear energy partnership, Europe has an opportunity to structure its relationship with Africa around continental interdependence while accelerating Africa’s interest and active participation in European peace and stability.

Africa’s non-aligned posture

For a long time, African countries have been known for holding a non-aligned posture during times of conflict between non-African nations. This traces back to the Cold War era when newly independent African countries sought to chart their own destiny between the competing Western and Soviet blocs. The non-aligned posture implies that African countries are not formally aligned with any major power bloc. This has enabled them to pursue diplomatic and economic ties with pro-Western and pro-Soviet (now pro-Russian) countries, while preserving their independence and autonomy in foreign policy decisions.

If African countries take sides in the war in Ukraine, they risk compromising their identity as non-aligned nations. If they take a stance against Russia, they further risk jeopardising economic cooperation with Russia, which has recently blossomed into nuclear energy partnerships—an area where Europe has been unable to support African development. This reveals that sometimes the non-aligned stance is not purely ideological but underpinned by pragmatic economic partnerships – such as Russia’s provision of nuclear technology for African nuclear development.

 

Russian-African nuclear economic integration

Russia’s state-owned nuclear corporation Rosatom is constructing nuclear energy facilities and providing capacity building and regulatory support to a host of African countries. Such partnerships include joint degree programmes, educational initiatives, workforce training, and the development of floating nuclear power plants to accelerate a clean and affordable energy supply for industrial and domestic consumption. These collaborative frameworks not only support Africa’s transition to nuclear energy but also facilitate the development of technical nuclear expertise in Africa.

Russo-African nuclear initiatives do not merely represent economic cooperation but create strong political bonds: such partnerships involve long-term development commitments, which make African governments wary of diplomatic actions that could imperil these projects - including open condemnation of Russia's military actions in Ukraine. Daniel Ajudeonu

In the long term, a thriving nuclear energy sector can give Africa the capacity to power its own industrialisation. Given Africa’s hopes for development through nuclear cooperation with Russia, it is unlikely that African countries will jeopardise this relationship by taking a stance against Russia in a conflict far away. Russo-African nuclear initiatives do not merely represent economic cooperation but create strong political bonds: such partnerships involve long-term development commitments, which make African governments wary of diplomatic actions that could imperil these projects – including open condemnation of Russia’s military actions in Ukraine. Therefore, Europe should not expect African countries to backtrack from their neutral stance towards the Russia-Ukraine war. Their position will likely remain one of non-alignment, consistently ‘calling for both sides to end the war and pursue peace.’

Securing Europe’s role in Africa’s nuclear development

Still, there is hope for European policymakers. Russian nuclear engagement in Africa not only promotes its economic interests but also serves as a diplomatic shield that limits African support for European-led condemnations in multilateral forums. Europe must acknowledge the reasons for African neutrality in the Ukraine war. Only if Europe offers comparable cooperation can it begin to counterbalance this influence and promote an African stance that is more in line with European security concerns.

The European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) maintains a pact with the South African government on mutual cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. This agreement covers research and development, use of nuclear materials and technologies, transfers of nuclear material and equipment, and nuclear safeguards.

However, European countries face intensifying competition from China and Russia, who are aggressively expanding their African nuclear footprints. Beyond Russia’s spread across many African countries, in 2024, China unveiled the China-Africa Forum on the Peaceful Use of Nuclear Technology. Although the scope of this Forum is yet to be made known, it will undoubtedly strengthen China-Africa cooperation in Africa’s nuclear energy development. As with many of China’s development projects in Africa, cooperative activities under this framework will most likely be implemented by Chinese entities, but in cooperation with African partners, further solidifying China’s grip on Africa’s nuclear sector.

An expanded partnership between Africa and Europe should transcend the limited scope of existing agreements through three key pillars - financing, technology transfer and localisation, and human capital development. Daniel Ajudeonu

This signals that European countries, especially those with advanced nuclear industries like France and Sweden, should establish a more comprehensive and attractive cooperation framework with African countries interested in pursuing nuclear energy. Cooperation should not only focus on reinforcing nuclear safeguards and strengthening nuclear safety and security, but also include a broader commitment to economic development, as this is the fundamental goal of Africa’s nuclear energy pursuit. An expanded partnership between Africa and Europe should transcend the limited scope of existing agreements through three key pillars – financing, technology transfer and localisation, and human capital development.

Towards a framework for African-European nuclear cooperation

Europe should create a dedicated African nuclear financing architecture that offers concessional incentives and standardised governance frameworks with greater transparency than traditional state-to-state agreements. A conduit for such cooperation could be the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development in partnership with the African Development Bank, since their missions align with providing financial assistance for development. Such a financing framework would differentiate European partnership from competitors who often rely on opaque bilateral arrangements, addressing African concerns about transparency and accountability.

European countries should also go beyond mere technology transfer to actively developing indigenous nuclear capabilities in Africa. Although technology transfer to Africa remains a critical debate in the global discourse due to the continent’s insecurity challenges and the developing state of its nuclear security architecture, European countries should establish adaptable special arrangements within nuclear export controls (such as the Nuclear Suppliers Group) that allow for ease of technology transfer to African countries without compromising safety and security needs.

Moving beyond limited cooperation agreements towards comprehensive nuclear partnerships that address African aspirations for development and energy security offers Europe a rare opportunity to simultaneously advance its own stability, counterbalance Russian influence, and build genuine interdependence. Daniel Ajudeonu

Investing in nuclear technology centres on the continent and ensuring joint ventures with European nuclear companies could also contribute to developing nuclear technology ‘made in Africa for Africa’. This approach could create jobs on the continent and signal Europe’s commitment to genuine technology transfer rather than creating African dependence—a concept that many Africans associate with colonial patterns and neocolonial dominance.

Finally, European countries must prioritise long-term relationship building through joint education and training programmes. When African and European nuclear professionals learn together and collaborate, they build relationships that can evolve into institutional partnerships and influence policy preferences as these professionals become decision makers. Europe can facilitate this by establishing academic and professional nuclear policy and engineering programmes that enable joint study at European universities and training centres. Given financial constraints, these programmes should be scholarship-based to ensure broad participation.

Moving beyond limited cooperation agreements towards comprehensive nuclear partnerships that address African aspirations for development and energy security offers Europe a rare opportunity to simultaneously advance its own stability, counterbalance Russian influence, and build genuine interdependence—but only if European leaders act with the urgency this opportunity demands.

The European Leadership Network itself as an institution holds no formal policy positions. The opinions articulated above represent the views of the authors rather than the European Leadership Network or its members. The ELN aims to encourage debates that will help develop Europe’s capacity to address the pressing foreign, defence, and security policy challenges of our time, to further its charitable purposes.

Image credit: Wikimedia CommonsPaul Scott