There are several reasons why Israel undertook its 12-day military campaign against the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI) in June this year.
First, because, according to the Mossad, “Iran can achieve a nuclear weapon in 15 days.” This came after Netanyahu’s earlier warning that stated Iran could produce a weapon “within a few months, less than a year.” No Israeli leader could live with these timelines.
Second, was the IRI’s extensive missile production capabilities. According to the IDF Chief of Staff General Eyal Zamir, Iran currently has 2,500 ground-to-ground missiles. Owing to its expanding production capacity, this number will reach 8,000 in two years. These missiles were fired in significant numbers at Israeli cities during the recent war, and the two previous attacks that Iran undertook in April and October 2024. Additionally, such missiles have been supplied for free to Iran’s proxies, such as Hezbollah and the Houthis.
Third, to destabilise the IRI leadership by attacking important symbols of power of the ruling regime. These included Tehran’s infamous Evin prison and the widely unpopular Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB) facilities. It seems that Israel hoped that such attacks, and the IRI’s inability to challenge Israel’s military superiority, would weaken the deterrence image of the regime at home and encourage protests. This, however, did not materialise. Most Iranians were too busy escaping from major cities, taking refuge, or trying to survive economically.
Going forward, Israel’s main options will be to observe and prepare. To observe Iran’s nuclear and missile programs and to see if Iran’s rulers decide to rebuild them. Special focus by Israeli intelligence is likely to be placed on the IRI’s nuclear sites, especially Iran’s main enrichment sites at Fordo and Natanz. The nuclear site at Isfahan is also expected to be another centre of focus as, according to reports, this is where the IRI developed the capability to convert enriched uranium into solid metal form, a required step to make a nuclear weapon. Despite it being assessed that this facility was destroyed, Israel will be keeping a close eye on it to ensure that it is not rebuilt.
The IRI’s missile building program will also continue to be the focus of Israel’s intelligence gathering. While there were varying reports about the accuracy rate of Iran’s missile strikes during the recent war, those that got through were found to be precise and able to cause significant damage. Israel will also continue to observe the IRI’s missile launchers as they play a crucial part in the IRI’s missile capabilities.
While Israeli intelligence focuses on Iran’s missile and nuclear program, all branches of the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) will prepare for the next round of fighting. Any sign that Iran is rebuilding its nuclear and missile program would likely push Israeli decision makers to order the next major attack against targets in Iran.
Israel launched the 12-day war against the IRI with Trump’s full knowledge and permission. Any future attack would also need the consent of the Trump administration.. If Trump does sanction such an attack by Israel, the duration of the war will also depend on him. Similar to the 12 Day War, Israel must adhere to his wishes to bring the war to an end.
Trump’s extraordinary impact on Israel’s Iran policies, especially regarding any decision to attack again, is based on several important factors. First, Trump’s decision to attack numerous Iranian nuclear sites during the 12 Day War is significant. Some assessments have questioned the real effectiveness of the US attacks against Iran’s nuclear sites. However, the Israeli government considers its ability to get the Trump administration to join the war against the IRI a considerable accomplishment. It is unlikely that the Netanyahu government will want to sacrifice this achievement by angering Trump. Netanyahu’s strategy regarding the current Gaza war depends greatly on Trump’s support. The consequences of this war could greatly impact his chances of reelection.
The Israeli government considers its ability to get the Trump administration to join the war against the IRI a considerable accomplishment. It is unlikely that the Netanyahu government will want to sacrifice this achievement by angering Trump. Meir Javedanfar
Second, Israel is currently renegotiating the 10-year military assistance MOU, signed under Obama. The current MOU “provides Israel with $3.3 billion in foreign military financing and $500 million for missile defence programs annually, for a grand total of $38 billion.” It ends in 2028. Success at these negotiations is vital for Israel’s future security. Angering Trump is not an option for any Israeli Prime Minister or government, as getting his agreement for a new MOU will be more crucial for Israel than before, as the Gaza war has been economically very costly. By the end of May this year, it was estimated that the war cost Israel at least $40 billion (142 billion shekels). It is expected that Israel’s planned occupation of Gaza will cost another $50 billion, thus pushing Israel’s budget deficit to 6-7%. US military and financial assistance, especially regarding missile defence capabilities and technology, will be more important than ever.
Meanwhile, it is quite possible that the Iranian leadership will do its utmost not to provide Israel with an excuse to attack again. At least in the immediate future, it may refrain from rebuilding its missile and nuclear programs. There are other reasons the Iranian leadership may undertake such a strategy. Currently, the European signatories of the Iran nuclear deal, namely France, the UK and Germany (also referred to as the E3), are accusing the IRI of violating the 2015 nuclear agreement. This is because Iran is violating key aspects of the JCPOA, including enriching uranium at 60%, a level that is far higher than allowed under the nuclear deal. Unless Iran begins to address some of these issues and restarts cooperation with the IAEA, the E3 have threatened to trigger by the end of August the mechanism that can lead to a snapback of all UNSC-mandated sanctions, before Resolution 2231 expires on 18 October. The possibility exists that in retaliation, the IRI could exit the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and dash towards a bomb. However, after the recent costly war against Israel and Iran’s dire economic circumstances, it is quite likely that the IRI will work towards a diplomatic solution.
Currently, Iran is facing an unprecedented electricity and water shortage crisis. They are crippling Iran’s economy and making the population more furious. If there were any rallying around the flag sentiment that was created in Iran after Israel’s attack, the ongoing water and electricity crisis is quickly evaporating it. In a special message broadcast to the people of Iran, the Israeli PM called on them to overthrow their rulers because of their inability to manage the various crises, including water. For now, it is unlikely that such a message leads to protests. However, the IRI leadership could face serious domestic instability if the water crisis continues.
Despite claiming victory against Israel, the IRI leadership is aware of the brewing crisis at home and the possibility of renewed attacks by Israel. It may wish to avoid new steps that could provoke Israel. The pressure being applied by the E3 and the threat of the snapback sanctions could further push the IRI towards reducing tensions. This could translate into reaching an agreement with the EU to return to the nuclear deal, while suspending the rebuilding of Iran’s nuclear and missile program. The reappointment of ‘Ali Larijani as the supreme leader Khamenei’s representative at the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) could be a sign attesting to this scenario. Larijani is known to be a moderate figure who has backed negotiations with the US.
While the possibility of another major Israeli military operation against the IRI exists, it is not a foregone conclusion.
The European Leadership Network itself as an institution holds no formal policy positions. The opinions articulated above represent the views of the authors rather than the European Leadership Network or its members. The ELN aims to encourage debates that will help develop Europe’s capacity to address the pressing foreign, defence, and security policy challenges of our time, to further its charitable purposes.
Image: Wikimedia commons, The White House from Washington, DC