When I was between 12 and 15 years old, I had a heavy cotton flag hanging above my bed. It was not the flag of Spain, where my family spent summer holidays. Nor was it the flag of Germany, the country I call home and where I hold citizenship. Instead, it was the American flag with its familiar pattern of stars and stripes, brought back by a family friend from a trip to the United States. To me, this flag represented freedom, democracy, and progress.
I am not sure the same is true today. I doubt that my 15-year-old self would now fall asleep under an American flag with the same sense of admiration. That seemingly insignificant change in perception of a teenage boy matters. It tells us something about a broader shift that can be observed across Germany in how perceptions of the US are shifting, especially among those who work in foreign and security policy – and those aspiring to do the same.
For Germany’s current crop of senior political leaders, the US is more than an ally. It is part of their political biography. Figures such as Chancellor Friedrich Merz belong to a generation shaped by the Cold War, the division of Germany, and the stabilising role Washington played in West Germany’s security and prosperity. For that generation, Atlanticism is not simply a strategic preference, it is a political instinct. Merz himself reflects that tradition. He chaired Atlantik-Brücke, a German think tank dedicated to strengthening the political dialogue between Germany and the US, from 2009 to 2019.
Younger Germans start from a different vantage point. Many of those now in their mid-twenties to mid-thirties came of age politically when Donald Trump first entered office in or around 2016. For them, Trump was not a temporary disruption to an otherwise stable order. He was the moment that shattered the assumption that the US would always remain a predictable guarantor of European security. Even the administration of Democratic President Joe Biden did not fully restore that older certainty. It looked more like a pause than a return to the world that existed before 2016.
The numbers reflect that change of perception regarding transatlantic relations. In late 2025, Pew Research Center found that 73 percent of Germans described relations with the US as “bad”. The same report also found that 38 percent of Germans saw the US as a major threat to their economy, while another 48 percent saw it as a minor threat. A German Marshall Fund analysis also shows that younger Europeans are less likely than older generations to view US influence positively. Put simply, younger Europeans are not transatlanticists by default, despite this being the status quo for decades among young future leaders in democratic parties, as well as in higher administrative and business circles in Germany.
Attitudes towards the US and transatlantic relations differ across ideological boundaries. Although younger conservatives, liberals, social democrats and greens disagree on many issues, they currently share one fundamental view: while the US may remain indispensable for the time being, it is no longer automatically dependable. Senior decision-makers in the country also recognise the changes in Washington, but many still approach the situation from the perspective that the transatlantic relationship will recover once the current turbulence has passed. This is the real divide.
The danger is that Germany’s strategic debate often still assumes that the correct approach is to rebuild trust and wait for normality to resume. Chancellor Merz has spoken repeatedly of the need for Europe and the US to repair and revive transatlantic trust. That instinct is understandable. But it risks underestimating how much has changed within the US itself. Even before Trump’s second term, parts of the American debate had already moved towards burden shifting, and a more transactional understanding of alliances. Berlin has often been reluctant to engage seriously with worst-case scenarios in which Washington expects Europe to carry far more of the burden for its own security.
The danger is that Germany’s strategic debate often still assumes that the correct approach is to rebuild trust and wait for normality to resume. Vincent Tadday
That matters not only for Germany but for Europe as a whole. Germany and France, for example, have long approached European security from different historical starting points. German foreign and security policy was shaped by the division of Germany and the rearmament of the German military within NATO in the 1950s, while France has traditionally placed greater emphasis on strategic autonomy. Trump’s return has sharpened that contrast, but it is also reshaping it. A younger generation in Germany increasingly sounds less certain that Europe can afford to define its future primarily through the hope of American reassurance and calls for true European collaboration. That does not mean turning away from NATO – it means recognising that a stronger European pillar is now necessary both for Europe and for the alliance itself.
So, what should be done? First, Germany’s political leaders must stop viewing any discussion about European sovereignty as a potential breach of the transatlantic alliance. This approach poisons the debate, slowing down any reform ambitions and preventing serious strategic planning. A stronger European defence capacity is not anti-American; rather, it is insurance against American unpredictability.
Second, rather than pretending it is a communications problem, Berlin should incorporate generational change into its strategy. The voices of younger people within political parties, government ministries, parliament and transatlantic institutions should not be dismissed as impatient idealism. They are responding rationally to the world as they have experienced it. If Germany wants a sustainable security policy, it must allow this generation to influence it before a crisis forces the issue.
Third, Europe should maintain open channels of transatlantic dialogue even as it develops its own capabilities. It is easy to be a transatlanticist when things are running smoothly. It is harder, and even more necessary, when trust is under pressure. This involves funding exchanges, supporting policy networks and maintaining serious contact with political figures in the US beyond the White House.
Germany is entering a new era in its relationship with the US. The old Atlanticist reflex has not disappeared. However, it no longer reflects the instincts of the next generation of senior officials. For them, the moral clarity of the Cold War is not the starting point. It is an era of disruption, doubt, and strategic volatility. Berlin should take this into account. The future of the transatlantic relationship will not be secured by waiting for the past to return.
This commentary reflects the author’s personal views and not those of his employer.
The European Leadership Network itself as an institution holds no formal policy positions. The opinions articulated above represent the views of the authors rather than the European Leadership Network or its members. The ELN aims to encourage debates that will help develop Europe’s capacity to address the pressing foreign, defence, and security policy challenges of our time, to further its charitable purposes.
Image credit: Michele Ursi / Alamy
