Over a decade after turning its back on the European Union and signing on to what amounted to essentially a Russian takeover of its economy, Armenia has seemingly done a complete 180-degree turn, with Armenian Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan signing a Charter on Strategic Partnership with former US Secretary of State Antony Blinken on January 14. This move, while hidden in the flurry of foreign policy activity that has characterised the transition period between the Biden and Trump presidencies, sheds light on the rapidly shifting alignment preferences occurring throughout the former Soviet Union. While this individual agreement is relatively limited in scope, it nonetheless excellently illustrates the recent ramp-up of shifting alignment preferences in the South Caucasus, and it is emblematic of increased autonomy in smaller states that is increasingly being observed throughout the former Soviet Union as a whole, especially in the aftermath of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022.
For Armenia: Decoupling from Russia – but a troubling lack of alternative guarantees
Armenian foreign policy, while traditionally linked tightly to Russian foreign policy preferences, has been changing for some time. After the 44-Day War with Azerbaijan in 2020, in which ethnic Karabakhi Armenians lost significant swathes of territory in the neighbouring Nagorno-Karabakh region, Armenian public opinion started to turn against Russia, as Moscow was seen to have inadequately supported Armenia, with whom it had an alliance through the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO). In the ceasefire agreement that ended the war, Russian peacekeepers were to protect the remaining ethnic Armenians living in Nagorno-Karabakh and protect the Lachin Corridor, which connected the region to Armenia. However, beginning in December 2022, Azerbaijani eco-activists – suspected by many to be supported by the Azerbaijani government – blocked the Corridor, and Russia proved either unwilling or unable to stop the blockade, leading to increasing frustration. As the situation in Karabakh worsened, Armenia stopped participating in CSTO meetings and exercises, and in September 2023, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan went so far as to call the Russia-Armenia alliance a “strategic mistake” in an interview. While Armenia technically remains a CSTO member state, since 2024, the Armenian government does not consider itself a member.
Since this break in relations, Armenia has begun turning toward other potential partners, including signing multiple defence deals with France and signing this recent Charter with the United States as well. Despite these burgeoning relationships, Armenia still lacks the sorts of security guarantees from truly “allied” partners that it enjoyed with Russia in the past. Through the Charter, the US agrees to help Armenia with border security, enhance interoperability, and expand defence consultations, among other things. However, the Charter falls far short of any true security guarantees. France’s involvement, while more significant than that of the US, also does not provide the same sort of protection that a formal alliance would.
Given these factors, Armenia remains in a difficult situation. In navigating tensions with three more powerful countries – Turkey, Russia, and Azerbaijan – Armenia is doing its best to seek assistance from other sources. However, the Pashinyan administration will certainly remember the experience of neighbouring Georgia, where then-President Mikheil Saakashvili pinned his hopes on the West amidst high tensions with Russia and paid the price, as the West did not come to bail him out, leading to the loss of Georgian control over 20 percent of its territory, Saakashvili’s fall from grace, and the eventual rise of the more Russia-amenable Georgian Dream party. Despite a positive step forward in relations with the US, Armenian policymakers will likely remain on higher alert than usual for the foreseeable future.
For the US: A bright spot amidst unfriendly developments in the region
For the United States, this positive movement in its relationship with Armenia represents a rare positive step in what has been a generally negative last few years for US influence in the South Caucasus and the broader region. The US-Georgian relationship, while traditionally quite positive, has become increasingly tense, culminating in the introduction of US sanctions against Georgian officials in late 2024 after controversial elections that resulted in a win for Georgian Dream, a more Russia-amenable party led by Georgian billionaire Bidzina Ivanishvili. Neighbouring Azerbaijan, meanwhile, has also sought closer ties with Russia, signing a “Declaration on allied interaction” with Moscow in 2022. The OSCE Minsk Group, which was co-headed by the US and was once responsible for conflict regulation in Nagorno-Karabakh, has essentially fallen apart, and Chinese investment has grown in the region across the board as well.
In addition to worsening relations between the US and the other two South Caucasus states, American relations with the three powers that surround the South Caucasus – Iran, Russia, and Turkey – have also either not improved or drastically worsened. After Donald Trump pulled the United States out of the JCPOA in 2018, relations with Iran have gradually gotten worse, and following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, US-Russian relations took a nosedive as well. Turkey, meanwhile, has gradually become more strategically autonomous in its foreign policy, turning from a steadfast NATO ally into more of a wild card.
In light of these developments in the region, the advancement of relations with Armenia certainly comes as a breath of fresh air for US policymakers. Most obviously, an Armenia that is friendly with the US instead of an active member of a Russia-based alliance is a distinct positive for the US, and a counterweight to deteriorating relations with other neighbouring countries is also appreciated. Additionally, this strategic partnership carries potential ramifications for US adversaries: the US has agreed to help support the diversification of Armenia’s energy resources, which is likely detrimental to Russia, and will also be directly involved in enhancing Armenia’s border patrol, weakening Russia, which formerly was responsible for patrolling much of Armenia’s border, and potentially giving the US closer access to Iran due to Armenia’s short southern border with Iran. While there are questions as to how the Trump administration will handle the relationship (although, allegedly, the Trump administration was involved in the decision), the agreement certainly represents a positive step for US policy.
For Russia: Largely negative implications
For Russia, this move is likely largely seen as the continuation of a broader trend of Armenia gradually attempting to distance itself from Russia; however, there are also individual aspects of the document that will spark worry in Moscow. Indeed, Armenia’s move away from Russia toward the West is not new; while Armenia has been a member of the Russia-led CSTO since its inception, relations between Armenia and the CSTO have been frosty for a long time.
Despite these trends, however, Armenia still has remained coupled to Russia in many areas – especially economically – and has had difficulty finding partners to effectively plug the security gap left by disengagement from the CSTO. Rhetorical disengagement is one thing; however, given the degree to which Armenia was and is tied into Russia economically, true “decoupling” has remained elusive. Large swathes of the Armenian population depend on Russia for seasonal work, and remittances from Russia still form a large part of the Armenian economy. Additionally, Russia-based businesspeople control many of Armenia’s key industries, including several key sectors that are critical to the functioning of the country, and Russia remains Armenia’s largest export and import partner by far. Finally, despite some rumblings early in the Pashinyan administration about a potential move away from the Russia-dominated Eurasian Economic Union (EEU), of which Armenia is a member, the Armenian government has publicly reaffirmed its commitment to the organisation and has worked to assuage Russian concerns about any potential policy shifts in this area. All of these factors indicate that true distancing from Russia is not realistic to expect from Armenia in the near future.
Nonetheless, this new strategic partnership introduces a couple of key elements that could affect Russia’s effective monopoly in the country and will likely be worrying for Moscow. For one, with US support, Armenia can develop its own capacity for border security at a quicker rate, replacing Russian border guards with Armenian ones. Armenia has gradually been drawing down Russia’s presence along its borders, including at a checkpoint along the Iranian border and at Yerevan’s Zvartnots Airport. Also, in addition to encouraging the diversification of Armenia’s energy supply, the US will enter into negotiations with Armenia on a so-called “123 Agreement” on civilian nuclear use. While Armenia’s one current nuclear reactor is currently fully dependent on Russia, Armenia has been looking for some time for bids to help replace the ageing reactor in 2036, and this 123 Agreement could show that the US may take the upper hand on this prospective future project. Given Russia’s established dominance in Armenia’s nuclear sector, this increased US involvement is likely not particularly positive news for Moscow.
How will Russia respond? There is obviously no way to know for sure. The most likely possibility may be Russia attempting to disrupt Armenia’s economy by pulling on the many levers of influence that the Kremlin enjoys within the country. Additionally, Russia could more openly support pro-Russian opposition groups in Armenia or go as far as to support a coup against the current administration. Perhaps we will see something akin to the Russian response to the 2024 ousting of Bashar al-Assad in Syria: just like in Syria, where Russia has managed to keep its military base for the time being despite moves away from a pro-Russian government, it appears likely to maintain its 102nd base in Armenia as well. Finally, while highly unlikely given a range of factors, there is little doubt that policymakers in Yerevan remember the 2008 Russo-Georgian War – when neighbouring Georgia pivoted in a similar way towards the West – and will hope to avoid such a scenario. Regardless, for Moscow, while this document will not force a complete change in the way the Kremlin approaches Armenia, increased US involvement in Armenia and the South Caucasus as a whole is certainly not looked upon favourably by Moscow, and this individual agreement will likely have negative impacts on Moscow’s power and influence in the region.
For the region: The only constant is change
Overall, the new Armenia-US strategic partnership not only represents a development in the bilateral relationship between the two countries – it also highlights the constantly shifting nature of alliance and alignment decisions in the South Caucasus and the former Soviet Union as a whole. Following recent flare-ups of conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh and Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, countries across the post-Soviet space have become increasingly flexible in their relations with more powerful states. In such an environment, the US and the West as a whole have been forced to look at countries not simply as clear “friends” or “foes” but as potential partners in different policy areas. This document is one clear example of this approach. Armenia remains tied to Russia in many ways; however, there is clear interest in working with the United States and other Western countries. While this Charter lacks strong security guarantees and will not lead to complete Armenian decoupling from Russia, it nonetheless undoubtedly marks a positive step forward in the US-Armenia relationship, both in the near- and long-term future.
The European Leadership Network itself as an institution holds no formal policy positions. The opinions articulated above represent the views of the authors rather than the European Leadership Network or its members. The ELN aims to encourage debates that will help develop Europe’s capacity to address the pressing foreign, defence, and security policy challenges of our time, to further its charitable purposes.
Image credit: Wikimedia Commons / U.S. Department of State
