French President Emmanuel Macron’s recent speech at the Île-Longue submarine base introduced a long-awaited framework for reconfiguring European deterrence amid an increasingly dangerous and uncertain security landscape. His remarks not only give substance to the “European dimension” of French nuclear deterrence, they also clarify its limitations, explicitly ruling out nuclear sharing. This shift addresses a long-standing desire for the Force de frappe (France’s sovereign nuclear deterrent) to serve wider European interests – an ambition that has intensified since 2020 but was long stifled by a lack of strategic clarity and German reluctance.

The invasion of Ukraine and the evolving approach by the United States to global alliances have catalyzed innovation in European defence thinking in unprecedented ways. Notably, shifts in Berlin have been crucial in giving substance to the renewed French approach to nuclear deterrence and escalation management. Macron’s new doctrine of “forward deterrence” (dissuasion avancée) is therefore not merely a French doctrinal update; it is a response to an evolving German partner. 

The success of this new architecture depends on the Franco-German “motor” finally moving beyond historical silence, translating strategic alignment into political and industrial cooperation while maintaining a credible commitment to international disarmament obligations.

Forward deterrence: Towards a European escalation management strategy

One of the central pillars of Macron’s speech – made on March 2 in front of the imposing figure of the nuclear submarine Le Téméraire – was the implementation of forward deterrence, a doctrine aimed at deepening French strategic reach while strengthening security for European allies. This framework operates across three distinct yet interconnected tiers: a French sovereign nuclear component, a European conventional division of labour, and a network of institutionalized bilateral dialogues. In this new strategic architecture, the Franco-German motor acts as the essential cog for the success of both the conventional and dialogue layers.

In the nuclear domain, France has opened the door for the temporary deployment of airborne strategic assets – specifically the Strategic Air Forces (FAS) – outside national territory. This shift allows non-nuclear partners like Germany to assist via observation or conventional support in nuclear-related exercises. While Macron remains firm that Paris will not share decision-making, planning, or implementation, the increased readiness and eastward signalling resulting from these activities bolster the credibility of France’s heightened European engagement. 

In his speech, Macron explicitly emphasized that the “survival of France’s closest partners” is inseparable from its own vital interests. While he did not name specific nations, the Franco-German communiqué issued shortly after reflects this priority. By establishing a dedicated bilateral framework, the declaration effectively grants Berlin “special treatment” and unique proximity to French strategic thinking.

Moving to the conventional layer, Macron articulated the “holistic approach” first mentioned at the Munich Security Conference earlier this year, identifying three priority areas for European investment: early warning, air defence, and deep precision strikes. These are not merely military line items but the foundational tools of a coherent European escalation management strategy. 

In a European landscape where conventional initiatives sometimes lack coordination, better planning and a clear repartition of efforts among Europeans will be key to enabling high-intensity escalation management, especially amid US announcements of “burden shifting” at the conventional level.

Forward deterrence is also anchored in a web of bilateral dialogues following a logic of concentric circles. At the core sits the United Kingdom, the only other nuclear power in Europe, whose long-standing nuclear cooperation with France was revitalized by the 2025 Northwood Declaration. The continental centrepiece of this new European architecture, however, is the Franco-German High-Level Nuclear Steering Group. This framework – a level of intimacy previously reserved exclusively for London – now serves as the primary forum for doctrinal dialogue and the coordination of a strategic mix encompassing conventional forces and missile defence alongside French nuclear assets. 

For partners such as Poland, the Netherlands, and Sweden, this Franco-German coordination will likely serve as the benchmark for their own future integration into a system meant to complement NATO rather than compete with it.

The German catalyst: From taboo to strategic evolution

The Île-Longue speech, and its subsequent operationalization, might never have materialized if Germany had remained in its traditional state of silence on nuclear issues. For decades, the French nuclear deterrent was a frequent but unrequited topic of conversation in the Franco-German relationship. German strategic thinking was historically characterised by a deep-seated reluctance to discuss nuclear matters outside the NATO framework.

The current reality of forward deterrence reflects a realization in Paris that such a shift was finally possible due to the emergence of new European partners – most notably a German leadership willing to move beyond this decades-long strategic silence.

Without Chancellor Friedrich Merz’s support for nuclear talks between Paris and Berlin, it is questionable whether the door would have been open on the German side. By publicly addressing it, Merz became the first German leader to break the taboo of expressing a desire to hold nuclear talks with European partners, ending a long period during which French nuclear offers had not resonated with Berlin. This dates back to the time of François Mitterrand and his Defence Minister Alain Juppé, who coined the term dissuasion concertée. Previously, the German government had neither responded to these offers of talks nor made any public references to them.

Merz provided Macron with the political cover necessary to move from abstract theory to the “European dimension” of French deterrence. Around the time of the 2025 Bundestag elections, he made it clear that he wanted to discuss the idea of a common European nuclear deterrent with both the UK and France. At the 2026 Munich Security Conference and on numerous other occasions, he emphasized the necessity and positive nature of nuclear talks with European nuclear-weapon states. By explicitly rejecting a German Sonderweg (a national nuclear arsenal) while simultaneously seeking “strategic intimacy” with Paris, Merz aligned German preferences with French sovereign red lines of not sharing decision-making or command of France’s nuclear arsenal.

Despite this leadership, the transition remains fraught with domestic tension in Germany. Internal debate highlights the difficulty of reconciling this renewed bilateral relationship with France alongside existing NATO commitments. Social Democratic Defence Minister Boris Pistorius warned of “double structures”, while Christian Democratic Foreign Minister Wadephul expressed concerns that Europe might send the wrong signal to Washington, inadvertently questioning the reliability of US deterrence. These concerns reflect a persistent fear in Berlin that a potential French or Franco-UK “nuclear offer” could create redundant systems, alienate Washington, and fail to provide equivalent protection to NATO’s nuclear umbrella – potentially generating growing rifts in the alliance. 

Operational and industrial perspectives: Bypassing stagnation and fears

Overcoming domestic reluctance and building lasting nuclear cooperation will rest on France and Germany’s ability to operationalize a credible forward deterrence strategy alongside European partners. Germany is best positioned – both geographically and politically – to position itself as the continental backbone of conventional support for Macron’s strategy. Berlin’s unprecedented investments since the 2022 Zeitenwende have provided the financial capacity to leverage European investments in high-intensity warfare capabilities. Moreover, German support for Ukraine and its substantial defense investments have positioned the country as a security provider for the Eastern flank. This credibility is critical to securing the support of Eastern allies, such as the Baltic states, who view French doctrinal shifts through the lens of tangible regional security.

Politically, the Franco-German relationship has demonstrated a unique capacity to bypass stalemates in flagship programs like the Future Combat Air System (FCAS). As the “Next Generation Fighter” pillar faced terminal delays in early 2026, the Île-Longue speech and subsequent Franco-German communiqué signalled that the tandem had opted for a decoupling strategy: separating immediate operational needs from long-term, stalled industrial cooperation. A prime example is the acceleration of the European Long-Range Strike Approach (ELSA) initiative. By formalizing the development of ground-launched and air-launched deep precision strikes – including the recent OWE 500+ (One-Way Effector) loitering munitions – France and Germany (alongside Italy, Poland, and the UK) are building the conventional depth required for escalation management. This capability provides a multi-layered response to threats below the nuclear threshold. Anchoring the conventional posture in current-generation industrial capacity and modular systems rather than 2045-dated promises allows the tandem to future-proof the forward deterrence strategy.

These cooperation frameworks respond directly to US demands for European allies to assume a greater share of the collective defence burden. By strengthening the European pillar of the alliance, this cooperation is increasingly received in Washington as a welcome contribution to Euro-Atlantic stability – and it is seen to address a core fear within German public opinion that a more autonomous French strategy might decouple American engagement.

The disarmament dilemma: a responsible narrative for 2026

The credibility of the forward deterrence model – and the Franco-German leadership behind it – now faces its most rigorous diplomatic test on the global stage. The French announcement of an intention to increase nuclear warheads and at the same time decrease transparency comes as states party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) prepare for the treaty’s Review Conference (RevCon) in April and May. Global tensions, the war in Ukraine, and global rearmament trends have left the treaty struggling over the last decade. The widening divide between nuclear and non-nuclear weapon states regarding Article VI commitments has put pressure on nuclear-weapon states to present themselves as responsible powers. Even more so there is the dilemma of reconciling this step with Article VI commitments. 

From an NPT perspective, while Paris maintains that adjusting its arsenal remains consistent with the principle of stricte suffisance in a degraded security environment, its planned expansion risks being perceived by other treaty members as a departure from long-standing restraint. Paris’s move toward even greater opacity than the UK – which at least retains a public warhead ceiling – risks alienating the Global South. This shift toward “deliberate ambiguity” is likely to draw sharp criticism from non-nuclear weapon states.Coordinated yet separate transparency discussions on national reports may build some goodwill, but they will not fully shield the new European architecture from scrutiny at the RevCon.

To navigate this, the Franco-German “motor” must extend coordination into strategic communication, with a careful division of labour. Berlin and Paris should develop a coherent narrative framing France’s involvement of European partners in strategic exercises and conventional support as a transparent, defensive adaptation. Paris also needs to tailor its justification for increased warhead ceilings to align with Germany’s political sensitivities. Distinguishing this shift from nuclear sharing is not only vital for the NPT audience but also necessary for Berlin to sustain domestic support for the broader strategic partnership. Central to this outreach will be highlighting the differences between Russia’s destabilizing movement of nuclear weapons to Belarus and the French model of involving partners in nuclear consultations while maintaining sovereign control. By synchronizing where possible while respecting differing domestic mandates, the partnership can manage non-nuclear states’ concerns.

France could further bolster this narrative by increasing transparency on safety, security, and reliability protocols, as set out in the Contrôle gouvernemental section of the Code de la défense. Non-nuclear states and allied countries would benefit from discussions ensuring nuclear arsenals worldwide are safe against emerging technological threats. This could set a positive example for other P5 states encouraging them to share unclassified information about nuclear safety, security, and reliability, and efforts to prevent inadvertent escalation.

For European states seeking closer collaboration with France, ensuring these initiatives do not compromise NATO cohesion remains a strategic priority. Although Macron emphasized in his speech that the dissuasion avancée complements rather than replaces the alliance’s nuclear deterrent, grounding these changes in transparent, collective frameworks will help strengthen the European pillar without creating divisions.

Ultimately, the success of this shift hinges on a sophisticated dual-track communication strategy. Internally, the Franco-German tandem must demonstrate to skeptical allies that this model enhances European security while reinforcing the alliance’s collective defence posture. Externally, by harmonizing narratives, Paris and Berlin can frame their redefined security architecture as a proactive contribution to Euro-Atlantic stability – presenting these changes as a responsible adaptation to a new security reality rather than a rift in the global non-proliferation regime.

The European Leadership Network itself as an institution holds no formal policy positions. The opinions articulated above represent the views of the authors rather than the European Leadership Network or its members. The ELN aims to encourage debates that will help develop Europe’s capacity to address the pressing foreign, defence, and security policy challenges of our time, to further its charitable purposes.

Image credit: Eliot Blondet / Abaca Press