Sometimes, nothing strategically significant happens in a decade — and then, within a few months, more than a decade happens (to paraphrase the infamous Russian revolutionary, V.I.Ulyanov). As we witness the dramatic self-reduction of American leadership in the world, particularly significant in the context of European security, the Old Continent must rejuvenate itself, lest Europe finds itself in a hospice of former great powers. As the UK and the EU declare a “new strategic partnership” ahead of a UK-EU summit at the end of May, I offer nine steps for Europe to take to succeed.

The American withdrawal is not entirely unexpected. When former US Defense Secretary Robert Gates paid his farewell visit to NATO Headquarters in 2011, I was invited to dinner with his fellow defence ministers as the head of the Slovak delegation. His message was clear: the last generation of American politicians for whom European security was an exclusive priority was leaving active politics. He predicted that his successors would divide their attention among Europe, the Indo-Pacific, the Middle East, and emerging strategic regions — and not just their attention, but more importantly, military capabilities, with a particular focus on the Pacific theatre.

The so-called ‘pivot to Asia’ began under President Bush and accelerated under Presidents Obama, Trump (in his first term), and Biden. The full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 temporarily slowed this shift, prompting the US to reinforce its troop presence in Europe, particularly along the so-called “Eastern Flank”, but it did not reverse the trend. After the dramatic first 100 days of the second Trump administration, the future is unfolding: the United States is partially stepping back from its role as the main guarantor of European security. The only question is to what extent this withdrawal will be partial.

This accelerated disengagement coincides with a populist-expansionist (some experts say “imperial”) “Jacksonian shift” in American foreign policy, presenting Europe with a new kind of challenge. The expansionist rhetoric regarding Greenland—and even Canada, as a member of the Commonwealth—goes beyond the issue of waning US engagement in Europe; it poses a direct risk to Europe’s integrity and role in global affairs.

Even if a new, non-Trumpist American president takes office in 2029, we have already reached a point of no return: transatlantic relations and US involvement in European security will never be the same. The heyday of the Transatlantic Alliance, built on a feeling of mutual strategic interdependence and trust, is definitely over. Even if the next US president were the most passionate supporter of Europe and multilateralism, it would take a generation to rebuild the trust between the two shores of the Atlantic — if that is even still possible (the Damoclean sword of “what if a Trump-like president returns” will continue to cast a shadow over our strategic calculations for the future). I say this as a lifelong, rock-solid Atlanticist.

Europe stands at a crossroads, and our response today will shape our future for decades to come. We can continue with business as usual, talking, drafting strategies, yet taking no meaningful action. Or we can finally seize responsibility for our own strategic destiny (important note: “talking”, e.g. diplomacy and strategy are still irreplaceable, just not sufficient). This article has the immodest ambition of charting a path toward that second option. So, what must we do?

First, we must rapidly move beyond the shock phase — or, as some might more accurately call it, panic. This means fewer debates about “what the US wants” or “how Russia will react.” Instead, we need to focus on ourselves: our goals, our interests, and our future. The more we centre our discussions around Trump or Putin, the more we allow their influence to destabilise our own strategic thinking. We must stop being reactive and start becoming active architects of our security environment. Our strategy should not be shaped by what others want, do, or say, but by our own long-term interests and values.

Second, we must focus on real capabilities. We are entering an era defined by raw, brutal power. We may not welcome it, but that is the emerging reality. While our values remain the backbone of our way of life — and must be defended — they cannot be our only source of strength. Values alone do not deter aggression; as someone infamously put it, “you can’t shoot strong speeches.”

In this new context, structures and strategies matter — but they are increasingly inefficient without credible, deployable forces. To put it plainly, one British armoured brigade deployed to the Baltic or Poland does far more for European security than a thousand declarations condemning Russian interference and aggression. The list of post–Cold War defence initiatives in Europe is long, but the list of actual capabilities developed is far too short. That must change. This is especially urgent when the idea of replacing US brigades in NATO’s defence plans is no longer a wild, implausible thought (… but for the time being, the need for European contingency planning for the defence of Greenland still looks even more scary and unrealistic).

Third, time is not on our side, especially given the long procurement and development cycles in defence. While increasing defence budgets is an essential first step, it is far from sufficient. We must also manage the expectations of both the public and the political class. An additional 1 percent of GDP invested in defence does not instantly translate into more deployable forces — not within a year, and often not even within several. Building real capability takes time — typically four to six years to complete the whole development cycle.

When it comes to strategic enablers like logistics, intelligence, and long-range strike capabilities – areas where Europe’s dependence on the United States is still most acute – even a decade may prove optimistic. If we want new capabilities to be ready and deployable in five years or more, we must act now and accelerate and streamline these cycles.

Fourth, mass matters. After the Cold War, Europe drastically reduced the size of its military forces. For instance, the British Army shrank from 153,000 personnel in 1990 to roughly 71,000 today. The Bundeswehr’s manpower was halved in the same period. Even more striking was the reduction in key categories of armaments. The UK’s tank fleet plummeted from 1,200 total tanks in 1990 to just 157 deployable Challenger 2s, while Germany’s tank numbers dropped from nearly 3,000 to fewer than 300. Politically and strategically — and, frankly, psychologically — these cuts made sense in the context of the dramatic post-1991 reduction in Russian military potential and the emergence of threats outside Europe. The focus shifted toward lighter, more mobile forces.

But those times are now in the past, and the battles of massed armoured brigades on the Ukrainian steppes have brought a harsh reality into focus. The future of European security will once again be defined not by a few light battalions deployed in the Sahel, but by dozens of armoured brigades in Eastern and Central Europe.

Fifth, the potential of the defence industry is crucial. Without a solid industrial base, there can be no mass capability. Building up this base takes years. While more technologically accessible items, such as artillery shells, can be ramped up in months — or perhaps within a year or two — more complex systems like tanks, armoured personnel carriers, and fighter jets are far more intricate and time-consuming to produce.

Incidentally, the US will face a similar challenge in the Indo-Pacific. While the US Pacific Fleet enjoys qualitative superiority over China, Beijing is closing the gap and gaining the capacity to outproduce the US in a prolonged conflict. And Russia, for its part, is already producing more artillery shells than the entire European Union, by 30 per cent this year, thanks to its warfighting-focused industry.

Sixth, we need to accelerate UK-EU security cooperation. There is no credible European defence without British participation, but even if the UK can lead (as a pas de deux with France), London needs stronger ties to Brussels. While there are existing European-British defence ties within NATO, perhaps in the future we need some additional, complementary EU+UK (+Norway) line of working, thinking, and planning together in light of US disengagement/expansionism. Only London and Paris have the necessary command and control capabilities and strategic culture to lead. Still, almost a year after the UK elections and the announcement of a “reset” in relations with the EU, we are still waiting to move forward. But there is no time. We need to rapidly uplift the ambitions of mutual cooperation: the UK should be more connected and lead. Nobody in Europe will say non/nein/nie to additional British brigades or airwings. This is London’s strength and Europe’s need. Win-win, just put our cards on the table, otherwise, Moscow will come along and throw the table upside down…

Seventh, there is a need for a European strategy towards Ukraine. The European approaches towards Kyiv before and post-2022 were developed as an appendix to the US strategy (by strategy, I mean a comprehensive, systemised policy at the strategic level). With Ukraine losing its strategic importance for the US, as Kyiv is no longer considered as vitally important to US security, Europe needs to step up and develop its own strategy towards Ukraine, independent from the US (without waiting for US approval). Europe needs to offer a credible alternative to Ukraine that complements NATO without replacing it and integrates Kyiv into the European strategic space. Due to the tyranny of geography, Ukraine is more important to European security than to American security. While it may be faster, easier, and less painful to do this with the US, sometimes circumstances are beyond our control, and ignoring them would be a mistake. The UK is particularly well-positioned to lead, or co-lead, this critical process.

Eighth, Europe must take leadership in nuclear non-proliferation. This is not only a basic European interest but also a moral obligation. The potential inflation of nuclear weapons could happen in two key regions — Northeast Asia and the Middle East — both of which would have devastating impacts on European security. Europe, alongside the UK, must actively contribute to and lead the non-proliferation regime, both at the P5 level and regionally.

Moreover, multilateral institutions, rules, and norms remain the backbone of European political identity, and they must continue to serve as such. Considering the US shift, the future of European nuclear deterrence should also be considered more thoroughly. Questions about the structure of European deterrence — whether it should be a European, EU, or French-UK initiative — must be addressed. How can other European nations be involved? What about capabilities, decision-making, delivery, and planning? These are critical issues that need further discussion – now.

Ninth, we must counter disinformation. We need to acknowledge that disinformation has the potential to win wars without firing a single bullet. Some countries on the Eastern Flank, such as Slovakia and Bulgaria, provide clear examples of how disinformation can create chaos, instability, and undermine public support, eroding a nation’s willingness to defend its core interests. We must not underestimate Russia’s determination to destabilise Europe from within.

A capable intelligence unit can inflict more damage from a keyboard than a brigade on the battlefield. And when they find local stakeholders to amplify their efforts, the impact can be exponentially greater. Countering disinformation must be a top priority for Europe to safeguard its unity and resilience. Not as an addition to defence, but an integral part of it.

Europe, including the UK, is at a crossroads. The decisions made now will determine whether it has a future as a relevant strategic actor. I hope we choose the right path. Otherwise, we risk transforming ourselves into a rich open-air museum for Chinese, Indian, and American tourists — but with no voice in shaping our own future.

The European Leadership Network itself as an institution holds no formal policy positions. The opinions articulated above represent the views of the authors rather than the European Leadership Network or its members. The ELN aims to encourage debates that will help develop Europe’s capacity to address the pressing foreign, defence, and security policy challenges of our time, to further its charitable purposes.

Image: Stephen Chung / Alamy Stock Photo