President Trump’s decision at Davos to temper earlier calls for US “ownership” of Greenland has lowered the immediate diplomatic temperature. Yet the episode has not resolved the structural questions it exposed. Greenland continues to occupy a central place in US defence planning and geoeconomic strategy, and the broader Arctic remains shaped by renewed Russian military activity and expanding Chinese economic interests. The underlying strategic drivers, therefore, persist, even if the rhetoric has softened. This will have consequences for Europe and beyond, requiring increased cooperation and strengthening alliance cohesion.

The position of the United States: power, ownership, and strategic geography

2026 started with President Trump’s intensified public calls for a US takeover or “ownership” of Greenland. From a European perspective, such statements were legally indefensible and diplomatically reckless. Yet they reflected a coherent (if disruptive) worldview in Washington.

Greenland occupies a central place in American strategic thinking and always has. It lies in the shortest corridor between North America and Eurasia, a critical node for early warning and missile defence, a platform for space and Arctic operations, and an increasingly significant repository of critical minerals. Alongside its calls for ownership, the US administration has simultaneously launched a major initiative to secure supply chains for 60 “vital” minerals and established a $12 billion strategic stockpile of critical minerals. In this context, the United States considers Greenland not just a symbolic but a long-term geoeconomic and geostrategic asset.

This strategic consideration is not new. Washington has long sought to anchor its position in Greenland—first through proposals to purchase the island, and later through institutionalised defence arrangements. The 1951 Defence of Greenland Agreement granted Washington broad basing rights under Danish sovereignty, which remained in effect throughout the Cold War. The current debate among US policymakers centres on whether such provisions are still sufficient in an era defined by great-power competition with China and renewed Russian assertiveness in the Arctic.

Indeed, China’s interest in airport infrastructure, mining projects and the attempted purchase of an abandoned naval facility (blocked by Copenhagen) clearly demonstrates that Greenland is already a site of strategic courtship. Russia-China cooperation in the area is also growing.

However, the US already enjoys extensive rights under the 1951 framework, including the establishment and operation of military bases, infrastructure, and unrestricted defence activities. If Washington were to seek sovereignty over specific “pockets” of territory (beyond an open-ended lease), that would represent a qualitative shift requiring Danish parliamentary consent and potentially a referendum. The difference between basing rights and ceded territory is not technical but about sovereignty.

In the US, public opinion data has shown overwhelming opposition among Americans to the use of force to assume control over Greenland and significant resistance to its purchase at taxpayer expense. At the international level, the primary risk lies less in imminent territorial loss than in the continued erosion of transatlantic norms.

What is at stake is the integrity of the post-Cold War process of alliance management. The US rhetoric around Greenland in January illustrates not only a more transactional approach to alliances but also a centralisation of US decision-making in the White House, weakening traditional interagency processes. For Europe, this increases unpredictability and strategic uncertainty, underscoring the need for a recalibrated EU approach to managing transatlantic disagreements, including a clearer understanding of the conditions under which a “pushback” may be warranted and the means by which it can be effectively exercised.

In January, European leaders’ response to the unprecedented US claim to the territory of a European ally was united and firm. Whether President Trump ultimately ‘backed down’ because of European unity, market reactions, domestic political constraints, or pre-negotiated understandings remains contested. But it seems clear that European unity played some role in altering the strategic calculus. For now.

Denmark-Greenland relations: between self-determination, economic sustainability and alliance security

Denmark retained control of Greenland after the loss of Norway in 1814, later integrating it      fully into the Kingdom in 1953, when it was granted the status of an integral part of the Danish state. Under the 1979 Home Rule Act and the 2009 Self-Government Act, Greenland now exercises extensive autonomy over domestic affairs, including education, health, fisheries, environment and social welfare. The 2009 Act explicitly provided a pathway to independence: a referendum in Greenland, negotiations with Copenhagen, and a final consent of the Danish Parliament. Sovereignty is thus legally structured and politically anchored in self-determination.

Regardless of the development in Denmark-Greenland relations, it is clear that any debate over Greenland’s territory without the inclusion of Greenlanders is highly problematic. Greenlanders must remain included and not marginalised in the strategic debates about Greenland’s future. The slogan from Greenland’s 2024 foreign and Arctic policy, ‘nothing about us, without us,’ should be a guiding principle.

Wider Arctic security in a changing strategic geography

When discussing the Arctic, it is worth disaggregating the region into North American, Russian, and European sub-regions, noting that strategic dynamics vary considerably across the three sub-regions.

In the North American Arctic (comprising the United States, Canada, and Greenland), there have been limited hybrid or kinetic threats in recent years, given the region’s proximity to the US homeland and the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) coverage.

By contrast, the European Arctic has experienced intensified military activity, hybrid operations, cyber incidents, and cable disruptions, particularly since 2022. Finland and Sweden’s accession to NATO has transformed the geostrategic balance not only of the European Arctic – now made up of only NATO members- but across the entire Arctic, creating a 7-1 alignment between like-minded NATO members and Russia.

Russia’s Arctic posture within the Russian Arctic remains significant. Since the mid-2000s, Moscow has reactivated dozens of Arctic bases and maintains a substantial icebreaker fleet. The Kola Peninsula hosts Russia’s secondary strike nuclear deterrent. At the same time, Russia faces sanctions-related constraints and insurance challenges affecting prospects for Arctic shipping and energy projects. Russian-Chinese cooperation in the region is growing, though Moscow remains sensitive to vulnerabilities near its Northern Fleet.

Climate change underpins all these dynamics. Melting sea ice is causing more unpredictability in potential shipping routes and access to resources, while simultaneously posing severe risks to infrastructure and Arctic communities. Economic incentives, such as hydrocarbons, fisheries, critical minerals, and maritime corridors, intersect with environmental fragility.

In this context, the escalatory US statements over Greenland suggest a misunderstanding of the threat. There is little evidence of imminent Russian or Chinese military encirclement around Greenland itself. Instead, hybrid and military pressures are more pronounced in the European Arctic and North Atlantic. The danger, therefore, lies in destabilising alliance cohesion in response to perceived threats.

Towards credible and principled responses in the Arctic

1. European solidarity must remain the default position when sovereignty is challenged within the Alliance. The rapid reframing of the Greenland issue as a NATO matter rather than a bilateral dispute proved effective. Institutionalising such coordination (for example, through regular Arctic-focused consultations within NATO, such as through Arctic Sentry) would reduce the scope for transactional bargaining.
2. Cooperation on Arctic security should be strengthened within existing legal frameworks rather than through debates over ownership. Updating and clarifying the 1951 Defence Agreement, enhancing joint exercises, improving surveillance and investing in Arctic infrastructure are all feasible within current sovereign arrangements. These steps would address legitimate military security concerns without undermining constitutional principles. Climate change should also be recognised as the most existential threat to Arctic security.
3. Greenland must be systematically included in all negotiations affecting its future. This is not only a normative requirement but a strategic necessity. Transparent engagement reduces the risk that external actors exploit grievances or economic vulnerabilities. Simultaneously, Denmark and its allies should support sustainable economic diversification in Greenland to mitigate dependency and limit the appeal of high-risk external investment.

This commentary is based on a discussion last month convened by the Younger Generation Leaders Network (YGLN) on the geopolitical pressures building in the Arctic and their implications for Denmark and Europe. The conversation explored the political, legal, and economic consequences for Europe and the credibility of transatlantic responses.

The European Leadership Network itself as an institution holds no formal policy positions. The opinions articulated above represent the views of the authors rather than the European Leadership Network or its members. The ELN aims to encourage debates that will help develop Europe’s capacity to address the pressing foreign, defence, and security policy challenges of our time, to further its charitable purposes.

Image credit: Wikimedia commons, Thule Air Base, Ann O’nyme