This commentary is part of the European Leadership Network’s special coverage of the 2026 NATO Summit, which will take place in Ankara on 7-8 July 2026. The series brings together expert voices to examine the key security challenges, strategic questions, and policy debates shaping the future of the alliance before and after the summit.
The so-called “Europeanisation” of NATO is a direct consequence of the reduction in the American political and military presence in Europe. At the outset, it is important to state that, despite many pessimistic views, NATO will not collapse, nor will the United States completely withdraw from the alliance. Europeans remain committed to maintaining the transatlantic relationship, just as Washington remains interested in retaining a presence in Europe. However, the nature of that presence will be different: reduced and redefined. Politically, Washington will step back from its uncontested strategic leadership on European security issues, leaving greater responsibility to Europeans. As my colleague Alexander Graef recently argued, filling that gap will be a challenge, as there is no single European leader on security and defence (perhaps a triumvirate of the E3, or the E3 plus Poland and Italy?). Militarily, the task will be to replace US combat brigades, fighter wings, naval platforms, and the so-called strategic enablers – the most complex challenge of all.
At present, however, it makes little military, political, or financial sense to build fully independent or parallel European military and command structures. Such structures would only consume already limited resources, even if those resources are gradually expanding, and ultimately would not provide a full replacement for existing alliance capabilities. Moreover, they would effectively separate US security from that of Europe, resulting in a strategic defeat that few would welcome.
It therefore appears far more effective to focus on evolution rather than revolution: gradually replacing American forces and capabilities instead of building exclusively European structures from scratch. Specifically, this means strengthening planning and command structures, expanding the European presence at operational and strategic headquarters (a much greater challenge than many realise, given the difficulty of finding sufficient numbers of experienced and qualified officers for member states to assign to alliance structures), and developing key strategic capabilities – the so-called “enablers” – such as long-range precision strike, strategic reconnaissance and intelligence support, air-to-air refuelling, and logistics.
Last but not least, it also means replacing the ground, air, and naval forces – the “mass” – that the Americans will gradually withdraw: several combat brigades, air formations, and naval vessels, potentially including an aircraft carrier group in the North Atlantic, together with its accompanying ships and submarines. Europe therefore needs a clear and realistic plan for how, when, and by whom these forces will be replaced, both at the alliance level and within individual member states. That plan must be supported by sustainable force development plans and long-term stability in defence spending.
The same applies to replacing American forces in the alliance’s collective defence plans, which set out how NATO intends to defend itself in the event of a major Russian attack against a member state, whether in the Baltic region, Eastern Europe, the Arctic, the Black Sea region, or several of these theatres simultaneously. This will require larger European armed forces, greater numbers of key weapons systems, and, above all – the most time-consuming and technologically demanding task – the development of independent European capabilities that do not yet exist, such as long-range precision strike, next-generation drones, and counter-drone capabilities.
Under the pressure of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, we can already identify a number of steps in the right direction that have been taken by European countries, even if not always guided by a clear strategic vision.
Europeans remain committed to maintaining the transatlantic relationship, just as Washington remains interested in retaining a presence in Europe. However, the nature of that presence will be different: reduced and redefined. Robert Ondrejcsák
The most notable is the significant rearmament that has taken place, which has also shifted the internal military balance within Europe. Although the politically agreed target of five percent of GDP for defence spending remains distant for most countries (with the exception of frontline states such as Poland and the Baltic countries), the new normal is around 2.5 to three percent. This is a significant change because these are not merely percentages. In real terms, they represent tens of billions of euros in additional defence spending across Europe. This will make it possible not only to launch crucial military procurement programmes – from more basic capabilities, such as artillery shells, to the most sophisticated systems, including fighter aircraft and submarines – but also to begin revitalising the European defence industry and expanding its production capacity. This is absolutely crucial if Europe is to be able to compete with Russia’s wartime economy in the future, which is already operating at full speed. The winners in this process will be those countries that not only invest, but are also capable of adapting their industries and research sectors to the new realities of warfare and the lessons learned from the war in Ukraine.
This is a broader pan-European trend. But there is another, equally important, development that follows closely behind: the shift in the internal European military balance. For decades, Europe’s leading military powers have been France and the United Kingdom, with their deployable capabilities, extensive operational experience, and well-developed command and control structures at the division and corps levels. However, this has now begun to change, at least in part. The enormous sums being invested in defence by Poland and, increasingly, Germany will shift the internal European balance in favour of Warsaw and, especially, Berlin.
Until around 2022, the French and German defence budgets were effectively equal. Following Russia’s full-scale invasion, however, Germany caught up rapidly, and its defence budget now significantly exceeds France’s. In 2026, it is expected to be roughly double (€120 billion compared with €60 billion). Poland, which already spends around five percent of GDP on defence, is also building by far the largest and most capable armed forces in Central Europe, with influence extending across the continent, particularly in terms of ground forces, both in size and capability.
Meanwhile, Paris and London are struggling to make similarly significant increases in defence spending. This shift in military weight towards Berlin and Warsaw will have important consequences for Europe’s internal political balance, as France has traditionally compensated for Germany’s economic dominance through leadership in defence matters. Unless France dramatically increases its defence investment, this balance is likely to change rapidly, and within a decade the European security landscape could look very different. That said, both the UK and France will retain important advantages as Europe’s nuclear powers, as well as their superior command and control capabilities and highly experienced, deployable forces. The “mass”, however, will increasingly be found in Germany and Poland.
The European defence renaissance will have another dimension beyond rearmament and capability development: the emergence of new security and defence partnerships beyond the transatlantic relationship with the US.
Until recently, Europe’s security partnerships were largely developed through NATO – with Canada, the UK, Norway, Turkey, and partners beyond the continent – and therefore with the political, military, and diplomatic participation of Washington. This is changing. In the future, these relationships are likely to become more direct. The UK will become much more engaged in European defence through bilateral partnerships (particularly with Germany, France, Poland, and Norway), minilateral formats (such as Nordic-Baltic cooperation), and EU-UK cooperation, including outside NATO structures. Canada is already participating in the SAFE programme as the first non-European country. Another example is the British-Italian-Japanese sixth-generation fighter aircraft programme, which brings together two of the US’s closest allies – Britain and Japan – to develop a strategically important capability without direct American participation. At the same time, the European Union will seek to strengthen partnerships with middle powers – including Canada, Japan, South Korea, Australia, and countries from the so-called Global South – that share an interest in multilateralism and a rules-based international order.
Any discussion of deepening partnerships must also include Ukraine. For European defence, the future nature of relations with Ukraine will be crucial. If these relations evolve from partnership towards integration – the first step having already been taken with the formal opening of EU accession negotiations with Kyiv – they could significantly strengthen European security, both through Ukraine’s military capabilities and by enhancing Europe’s credibility on the global stage. The EU would demonstrate that it is both capable of and willing to act decisively to protect its strategic interests, while reinforcing its ambition to become a stronger geopolitical actor.
Most importantly, however, we must recognise that the alliance has changed for good. Whoever occupies the White House after Donald Trump, there will be no return to the status quo ante. The process of NATO’s Europeanization will continue. It is therefore better to prepare for this new reality than to dream of the good old days. Because perhaps the good old days are now.
The European Leadership Network itself as an institution holds no formal policy positions. The opinions articulated above represent the views of the authors rather than the European Leadership Network or its members. The ELN aims to encourage debates that will help develop Europe’s capacity to address the pressing foreign, defence, and security policy challenges of our time, to further its charitable purposes.
Image credit: NATO / Flickr
