In May 2026, States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) will meet for the 11th Review Conference under exceptionally difficult circumstances. The war in Ukraine continues, the proliferation crisis surrounding Iran has deepened, debates on renewed nuclear testing and reversed disarmament have resurfaced, and transatlantic relations are strained, including over the territorial integrity of Greenland.

In these times, European support for and leadership in the NPT are more urgent than ever. This commentary series explores different European perspectives on the Treaty and the 2026 Review Conference, with a view to identifying shared challenges and opportunities to enhance cooperation across Europe.

This week, ELN Senior Associate Fellow Łukasz Kulesa outlines Poland’s perspective on the NPT and its approach to the 2026 NPT Review Conference. 

As a staunch proponent of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), Poland will aim to demonstrate its support for the NPT’s goals and contribute to meaningful outcomes during what is likely to be a highly confrontational Review Conference (RevCon) in New York. At the same time, Poland will prioritise its own security requirements while remaining realistic about the likelihood of achieving progress under what is an undoubtedly difficult and unpredictable international security environment.

The war in the Middle East will weigh heavily on the upcoming RevCon, raising broader questions about potential consequences for the global non-proliferation regime. Beyond Iran, there is a long list of contentious issues which may derail the Conference, including a lack of progress on disarmament (Article VI), strain over extended nuclear deterrence and nuclear sharing arrangements, and concerns about the consequences of Russia’s ongoing war with Ukraine.

Given these circumstances, the RevCon may turn out to be an exercise in damage limitation rather than an occasion to chart a forward-looking agenda. Still, Poland can play a role in sustaining the NPT, both by reaffirming its own adherence to the Treaty and its objectives, and by supporting proposals for strengthening its three key pillars – non-proliferation, disarmament, and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

The importance of the NPT

Poland has long supported the NPT as the cornerstone of the global nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament architecture. Still, recent events have created a need to address new threats – including Russian nuclear coercion and potential aggression, and the expansion and modernisation of its nuclear arsenal – which have led to a renewed focus in the domestic debate on the credibility of nuclear deterrence.

Poland has signalled its interest in joining NATO’s nuclear sharing arrangements and has entered into dialogue with France on nuclear deterrence cooperation. In February 2026, Polish President Karol Nawrocki expressed his support for bolstering the country’s security “even on a base of a nuclear potential” while respecting “all international regulations”. Prime Minister Donald Tusk, meanwhile, said Poland will not want to “remain passive” on nuclear security issues, concluding, “As our capabilities grow, we will strive to prepare for the most autonomous actions possible”.

While these interventions and statements have attracted global attention, they do not seem to herald imminent policy change. Leaving aside the strategic, political, legal, military, economic, and technical challenges of moving towards a sovereign nuclear weapon capability – not to mention the potential reactions of partners and adversaries – undermining the NPT would not be in the national interest of Poland, which has positioned itself as a strong proponent of the rules-based international order.

While the need to take legal commitments under the NPT into account, the policy debate in Poland tends to focus on the security dimension and credibility of existing nuclear deterrence guarantees. Political statements and public debate on these issues attest to a high level of anxiety over Poland’s security. At the RevCon, however, Poland is likely to strongly and unequivocally restate its commitment to the Treaty, including its non-proliferation clauses. It can also point to its robust non-proliferation credentials and perfect nuclear safeguards record, including its adherence to the Additional Protocol.

Polish priorities for the 2026 RevCon

Poland has declared a commitment to contribute to a successful outcome of the RevCon, which at minimum would include conducting a thorough examination of the functioning of the Treaty and attempting to reach an agreement on a substantive final document. As a member of the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative (NPDI), Poland has been co-developing a Landing Zone paper which will offer compromise language and recommendations across the three pillars.

At the RevCon, Poland will likely criticize Russia’s recent changes to its nuclear posture and modernisation efforts, as well as its recent deployment of nuclear-capable missile systems in Belarus, and its continued military occupation of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant in southeastern Ukraine.

Looking beyond Europe, Poland will likely also highlight nuclear and missile developments in North Korea and call on China to clarify its intentions with respect to its rapid expansion and modernisation of its nuclear forces.

The question of the legality of NATO’s nuclear sharing arrangement under the NPT has been raised at previous RevCons, and it will probably come up again this year. Together with other NATO countries, Poland views these arrangements as fully compliant with the Treaty, and considers its security situation as necessitating continued reliance on extended nuclear deterrence.

In the context of Article VI implementation, Poland is likely to support calls for new negotiations on nuclear arms control limitations, preferably engaging China, and their expansion to include non-strategic systems which were outside of the remit of the New START Treaty, which expired on February 5, 2026. At the same time, Poland’s immediate goal is strategic risk reduction, including increasing transparency and reporting on stockpiles. Poland will likely avoid directly confronting the policy choices of its three nuclear-weapon allies regarding their postures and doctrine. Instead, it may emphasize its commitment to the step-by-step implementation of Article VI, signalling that any increased reliance on nuclear weapons should be temporary rather than permanent, and framed as a response by the United States, United Kingdom, and France to a deteriorating security environment.

On Iran, Poland has consistently favoured a diplomatic resolution to the nuclear crisis, centred on Iran’s return to compliance with its safeguards obligations and the provision of full access to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Soon after the conflict began, Poland refrained from direct criticism of the US-Israeli operation and expressed hope that “Iran will stop posing a threat to its region” – however it ruled out direct military involvement and expressed concerns about regional destabilisation rippling beyond the Middle East and into Europe. When the war ends, Poland will most likely focus on stabilising the situation, expecting Iran to remain within the NPT framework and shifting attention toward securing its remaining nuclear infrastructure and materials, as well as potentially dismantling elements of the programme, ideally with the involvement of the IAEA, given its central role in monitoring and verification.

With regard to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, Poland is moving forward with the construction on its first nuclear power plant while pursuing a broader program for nuclear energy development – without seeking enrichment or reprocessing capabilities – and in partnership with a range of international partners. It therefore has a strong interest in sustaining and facilitating cooperation under the Treaty’s third pillar, as well as in strengthening the IAEA’s role in supporting these efforts.

Between NATO cohesion and EU coordination

Poland’s position on the NPT is firmly embedded within both its NATO and EU policy frameworks. Given the important role of nuclear weapons in NATO’s deterrence posture, and the alliance’s shared assessment of the threat environment, member states will seek to remain united in opposing the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) and its rejection of nuclear deterrence, while continuing to defend the legality of nuclear sharing arrangements. Poland is likely to play an active role in facilitating and supporting coordination among NATO allies in this regard.

At the same time, NATO cohesion may be tested by differing views on the scope of support for its three nuclear-weapon members – for example, in response to potential US preparations to resume nuclear testing. In such a scenario, Poland could call on China and Russia to address US allegations of their own testing activities, while underscoring the importance of upholding the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT).

Historically, the EU and its member states have been supporting the NPT and have frequently been described as bridging the divide between states relying on nuclear deterrence and nuclear disarmament-focused countries. The European Council’s conclusions on the NPT, adopted in December 2025, reflects well the preferences of its member states, including Poland, regarding the agenda for the RevCon and the envisioned level of ambition.

EU states’ coordination at RenCons has been crucial for upholding a common position and being able to offer compromise solutions. Yet, given the context in which this year’s Conference will take place, the EU’s role may be unusually limited.  The EU’s often-cited bridging role may no longer be viable in a highly polarised RevCon, as the bloc may struggle to effectively address the most contentious issues – particularly those related to Article VI implementation, the consequences of the Iran conflict, and the continued reliance of many of its member states on nuclear deterrence.

The future of the NPT

The long-term viability of the NPT will depend less on the outcome of the 2026 RevCon than on whether member states continue to see value in the Treaty as a framework that supports their security and economic development – by upholding disarmament and non-proliferation obligations while enabling cooperation on the peaceful use of nuclear energy.

The positions of countries that may be considering nuclear hedging, such as South Korea and Poland – by developing the infrastructure and expertise needed to potentially pursue nuclear weapons – will become increasingly significant. The NPT regime may come under strain not only from “rogue states” pursuing clandestine nuclear programmes, or from a lack of progress on Article VI and the reversal of past gains, but also from declining support among middle powers that have traditionally been among the Treaty’s strongest advocates.

While Poland is unlikely to be a decisive voice, its choices regarding the development of domestic nuclear capabilities, coupled with a clear recommitment to the NPT’s principles and active engagement across its three pillars, could help reinforce consensus around the continued relevance of the non-proliferation norm.

The European Leadership Network itself as an institution holds no formal policy positions. The opinions articulated above represent the views of the authors rather than the European Leadership Network or its members. The ELN aims to encourage debates that will help develop Europe’s capacity to address the pressing foreign, defence, and security policy challenges of our time, to further its charitable purposes.

Image credit: Aliaksandra Yadzeshka / Unsplash