In May 2026, States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) will meet for the 11th Review Conference under exceptionally difficult circumstances. The war in Ukraine continues, the proliferation crisis surrounding Iran has deepened, debates on renewed nuclear testing and reversed disarmament have resurfaced, and transatlantic relations are strained, including over the territorial integrity of Greenland.
In these times, European support for and leadership in the NPT are more urgent than ever – yet they may be complicated by diverging priorities among European states. This commentary series explores different European perspectives on the Treaty and the 2026 Review Conference, with a view to identifying shared challenges and opportunities to enhance cooperation across Europe.
This week, Carmen Wunderlich reflects on Germany’s perspective on the NPT and its approach to the 2026 NPT Review Conference.
Half a century after its accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in 1975, Germany continues to view the NPT as the cornerstone of the international nuclear order and a core element of national and European security.
Historically, Germany has pursued a balanced, reformist approach across the NPT’s three pillars, emphasising entry-into-force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), transparency, verification (including for nuclear-weapon states), and incremental disarmament to build mutual confidence and ensure irreversibility. For Berlin, the Treaty’s relevance has, if anything, increased with the erosion of the broader arms control architecture and rising geopolitical instability following Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine. These developments, alongside renewed US isolationism and uncertainty about extended deterrence, have reinforced Germany’s reliance on the NPT as a stabilising framework that constrains proliferation pressures. At the same time, Berlin acknowledges the NPT’s deficits in effectiveness and credibility, especially the lack of progress on nuclear disarmament and on regional non-proliferation crises. This dual perception, indispensable yet endangered, has shaped Germany’s past but also current NPT diplomacy.
That said, Germany’s current policy towards the NPT reflects not only a change in tone but also a gradual shift in priorities. The “Zeitenwende” has redirected attention towards pragmatic measures such as risk reduction and confidence-building through enhanced transparency and accountability, while multilateral disarmament seems to have lost political salience. Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Germany has pursued a complementary approach that prioritises national and European security, emphasising deterrence alongside non-proliferation and arms control, but remains nominally committed to the long-term goal of a nuclear-weapon-free world and the NPT acquis, including its catalogue of action-items across all three pillars. This recalibration has muted earlier disarmament activism and made nuclear deterrence rhetoric more explicit, as reflected in the marked defence of the legality of nuclear sharing during the 2022 NPT RevCon.
German objectives for the 2026 Review Conference
Heading into the 11th NPT Review Conference, Germany’s declared objective is to preserve and revitalise the Treaty’s credibility through a forward-looking agenda of practical, verifiable progress. Berlin presents itself as a mediator between nuclear‑weapon states and disarmament‑oriented actors, stressing that deterrence, non‑proliferation, and disarmament are mutually reinforcing rather than contradictory. Priorities include strengthening non‑proliferation, advancing risk reduction, and addressing both challenges and opportunities of new technologies, particularly for verification.
On non-proliferation, Germany continues to present a diplomatic solution to the Iranian nuclear program, long a flagship project of its foreign policy, as its preferred approach and stresses strengthened safeguards and transparency as essential to upholding the NPT’s relevance. Yet, in light of recent developments in the Middle East, where Berlin has aligned itself politically with US- and Israeli-led military counterproliferation actions against Iran, this commitment appears increasingly ambivalent. Such tensions between professed multilateral non-proliferation goals and support for measures that arguably sit uneasily with NPT principles risk eroding Germany’s credibility as a guardian of multilateralism and feed long-standing critiques by non-aligned members of Western double standards.
Berlin presents itself as a mediator between nuclear‑weapon states and disarmament‑oriented actors, stressing that deterrence, non‑proliferation, and disarmament are mutually reinforcing rather than contradictory. Carmen Wunderlich
In this context, Germany’s emphasis on risk reduction as a complement to disarmament appears increasingly shaped by a security-driven logic rather than a normative commitment to rolling back reliance on nuclear weapons. Berlin continues to advocate for feasible, even if modest steps: negative security assurances and upholding momentum on the CTBT and a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT), enhancing transparency and accountability through NWS reporting on Article VI. It also advances nuclear disarmament verification through multilateral initiatives such as the International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification (IPNDV), the UN Group of Governmental Experts, and Germany’s recent EXPAND expert panel on developing practical verification methodologies. Through the Stockholm Initiative, Germany addresses emerging technologies, exploring their verification implications alongside risks from cybersecurity and AI to nuclear command-and-control systems. Yet these “technical” solutions are framed largely within an order‑preserving framework that appears to accept the nuclear status quo rather than asserting an active disarmament leadership role.
EU coordination and transatlantic strains
Germany’s NPT diplomacy unfolds within a dense web of multilateral alignments, above all the European Union. Historically, Germany has used the EU framework as a force multiplier for pragmatic non‑proliferation, from drafting the 1995 campaign for indefinite extension to shaping the 2000 and 2010 EU common positions that fed directly into NPT outcomes. The EU Council Action for the 2026 NPT Review Conference echoes German priorities, while Berlin’s diplomatic weight and technical expertise continue to lend substance to EU positions.
The 2026 Review Conference will deepen pressures on European coordination amid sharpened transatlantic frictions. A more transactional US foreign policy under Trump-II will likely translate into NPT positions prioritising arsenal modernisation and coercive non-proliferation over EU-backed multilateral arms control frameworks (further nuclear reductions, FMCT, CTBT), and rejecting even incremental disarmament measures (NWS reporting perceived as constraining US freedom of action). It remains to be seen whether Germany could maintain its bridge-builder narrative if Washington continues its current course and acts as a “spoiler” at the Review Conference. In any case, any visible rift between the US and Europe would undermine Western coherence under the NPT.
It remains to be seen whether Germany could maintain its bridge-builder narrative if Washington continues its current course and acts as a “spoiler” at the Review Conference. Carmen Wunderlich
Concerns about the reliability of US extended deterrence are already straining NATO cohesion and could deepen intra-EU divisions. Macron’s recent proposal to deepen European nuclear deterrence cooperation, including closer collaboration with Germany, may provoke political controversy among disarmament-friendly EU members. France’s announcement that it intends to expand its nuclear arsenal and to cease disclosing its exact warhead numbers risks undermining both Germany’s traditional NPT-based emphasis on transparency and Berlin’s credibility as a proponent of accountability within the NPT framework. In this context, the 2026 Review Conference is likely to expose tensions between Germany’s alliance-centred security posture and its professed commitment to multilateral arms control, raising the question whether its “bridge-builder” image serves to reconcile or to obscure these competing priorities.
Prospects for the NPT after 2026 and Germany’s future role
The NPT’s post‑2026 trajectory will likely remain evolutionary rather than transformative. Given deepening strategic rivalries, progress will depend on incremental institutional adaptation – enhanced transparency, reporting, and procedural reform of the review process – coupled with renewed commitment to the Treaty’s core norms. Germany is well-positioned to help shape this agenda.
Looking ahead, Germany’s main challenge will be remaining a normative anchor in an increasingly transactional nuclear order. This requires defending multilateralism and international law against both geopolitical revisionism and alliance exceptionalism. Upholding the NPT acquis offers a principled foundation, but it will carry little weight unless Berlin backs its rhetoric with concrete practice. Equally important is maintaining credibility through example and the readiness to name violations, including those by (allied) nuclear-weapon states.
Germany’s contribution to the NPT’s future will thus hinge not only on preserving the regime but on demonstrating that restraint, transparency, and cooperative security remain effective strategies in a harsh security environment. To do so, Berlin must confront the growing gap between its self-image as a defender of multilateralism and an NPT bridge-builder and its actual policy choices – whether in relation to military counterproliferation, such as in Iran or silence on possible nuclear-weapon-related activities by allies.
In such a context, Germany’s ability to sustain an integrative narrative around the NPT as a shared global public good that seeks to prevent nuclear war will be crucial. If the Treaty is to retain its legitimacy, it must be seen not only as a technical or security‑management instrument, but also as a moral and political compact. By aligning its practice more closely with its professed commitments, Berlin could help reaffirm the NPT’s enduring relevance and prove that, even in an age of deterrence revival, the pursuit of arms control and disarmament must not be allowed to fade into nostalgia.
The European Leadership Network itself as an institution holds no formal policy positions. The opinions articulated above represent the views of the authors rather than the European Leadership Network or its members. The ELN aims to encourage debates that will help develop Europe’s capacity to address the pressing foreign, defence, and security policy challenges of our time, to further its charitable purposes.
Image credit: President of Ukraine / Wikimedia Commons
