Scientific advances, including artificial intelligence and gene editing techniques, have renewed a discussion around the possibility of deliberate, potentially devastating biological attacks. These serve as a sharp reminder to rethink how these threats can be deterred and mitigated. Governments are susceptible to reverting to familiar means of deterrence to prevent biological attacks: nuclear weapons. Among the P5, the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and Russia reserve the right to use nuclear weapons to deter non-nuclear strategic attacks. For example, the UK, in its 2021 Integrated Review, promises “not to use, or threaten to use, nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear weapon state party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.” However, they explicitly reserve the right to do so if “chemical and biological capabilities, or emerging technologies that could have a comparable impact, [make] it necessary.”

Yet, the track record of that approach is questionable. Despite attempts at deterrence and the near-universality of the prohibition of biological weapons, codified in the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), bioweapon allegations are regularly made out in the open. For example, the US publicly maintains that Russia, Iran, and North Korea still have the intent to produce biological weapons and are actively pursuing bioweapon programs. Russia, in turn, has raised similar claims about the US and Ukraine, which have been independently debunked.

However, trying to deter and prevent biological threats with nuclear weapons risks two major pitfalls. First, deliberate biological threats are harder to attribute than nuclear attacks. Nuclear deterrence rests on the premise that attacks are quickly attributable. Because an attacker would know that the action will be attributed to them, nuclear decision-makers are susceptible to being deterred by threats of retaliation.

Bioweapons are different. Attributing biological weapon attacks could be a much harder exercise. Debates over the origin of COVID-19 show how hard pinpointing the exact origin of an outbreak can be. This makes deterrence by punishment – nuclear deterrence’s founding principle – inapplicable.

Second, an expansion of nuclear deterrence to include biological threats is undesirable because it could further erode the taboo against nuclear use. Nuclear weapons pose problems beyond the big question of strategic stability between great powers. For example, the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine has woken up the West to the danger of nuclear blackmail. To strengthen norms around responsible use of nuclear weapons and promote restraint, the West should not turn to the same tactic to deter biological weapons.

Nuclear attacks know no remedy. Biological threats, catastrophic as they may be, have the potential to be mitigated using a range of available protective and managing measures. The focus should, therefore, be on reducing biological risks instead of constantly threatening to escalate further.

To prevent bioweapon allegations from becoming reality, states should use the existing procedures under the BWC to discuss their concerns transparently. Early-warning systems for outbreaks and preparedness efforts could help mitigate biological attacks and potentially even have a deterrent effect by denying an attacker the desired effect.

Leveraging international agreements to enhance transparency

A robust common understanding of the threats is key to countering and addressing biological attacks. In contrast, unjustified claims and disinformation only erode biodefense efforts. The fact that nearly all states across the globe have, at least on paper, signed on to the prohibition of biological weapons in the BWC opens a strategic window to build a better understanding of the biological threats we are facing today.

The consultative procedure under Article V of the BWC enables States Parties to voice and discuss concerns about non-compliance. While this consultative procedure is susceptible to misuse through disinformation, it, in turn, also offers a transparent, neutral venue to share concerns, confront the party under suspicion, and engage and convince others of the validity of the claims. Although Article V meetings are not court cases, and the BWC lacks the mandate to ensure accountability for breaches, these meetings could serve as a starting point to build the willingness and legitimacy to pursue further policy action to prevent deliberate biological threats. The public nature of the process could also have a significant deterrent effect on others who intend to breach their obligations with the BWC.

To achieve this desired effect, the consultative meetings must be conducted transparently and focused on the substance as much as possible.

First, transparency is key to achieving the desired effect of building legitimacy. Bioweapons claims are easily caught in the crossfire of geopolitical competition, and transparent engagement with the subject matter could be a way to reach across the aisle. Transparency should not only be ensured by publicly sharing national statements from open and closed meetings as official documents on UN platforms, but also by the kind of evidence presented. Open-source intelligence, where possible, offers a great opportunity to make independently verifiable claims and could publicly support classified intelligence.

Second, the meetings should engage with any accusations of bioweapon use or manufacturing as objectively as possible. The requesting party should make their questions to the accused party public before the meeting. Further, the requesting party should encourage other States Parties not to blindly support on political grounds but to engage critically with the presented materials. This can be achieved by encouraging the participation of independent experts in national delegations and making funds available for States Parties who cannot afford to send national subject-matter experts to Geneva. Additionally, States Parties should consider bringing in independent experts to evaluate the evidence, for example from organisations such as the World Health Organisation.

A menu of options to mitigate biological threats

Building on a common understanding of the threat, an effective follow-up on such an international process could consist of a multilateral coalition of the willing, e.g. modelled after the international partnership against the impunity for the use of chemical weapons to mitigate biological threats. Two lines of defence could be part of such a strategy:

First, robust early detection capabilities to help guard against the full spectrum of biological threats: If an outbreak is detected early, it can be quickly contained before turning into a potential catastrophic pandemic. Advances in disease surveillance methods, for example, ​metagenomic sequencing for threat-agnostic early detection, could help detect novel pathogens out of a background of environmental biological data. To fully take advantage of these detection techniques, partners should not only individually increase resources but also ensure the interoperability of different types of health surveillance data between countries.

Additionally, a stronger focus on preparedness efforts can help mitigate biological attacks if they occur. The availability of medical and non-medical interventions to counter outbreaks is key; this could include improving the environment for accelerated development of medical countermeasures for novel diseases and sufficient stockpiling of advanced personal protective equipment.

Taken together, an international spotlight on potential bioweapons programs, early detection of outbreaks, and strong preparedness could not only mitigate outbreaks but also prevent biological attacks from occurring. Higher political costs because of transparent BWC procedures and lower chances of a successful biological attack through early detection and protective measures might deter an attacker from even trying.

Nuclear weapons are not fit for the purpose of deterring biological attacks. Leveraging the mechanisms of the BWC and focusing on deterrence-by-denial strategies can effectively mitigate risks. Advanced early warning systems and enhanced pandemic preparedness efforts are imperative to uphold global norms and ensure a safer future for all.

The European Leadership Network itself as an institution holds no formal policy positions. The opinions articulated above represent the views of the authors rather than the European Leadership Network or its members. The ELN aims to encourage debates that will help develop Europe’s capacity to address the pressing foreign, defence, and security policy challenges of our time, to further its charitable purposes.

Image credit: Wikimedia Commons / U.S. Airforce