Until two months ago, Iran’s domestic and foreign policy appeared set in stone for at least the next five years, with no room for even tactical adjustments. Ebrahim Raisi’s three-year presidency was characterised by authoritarian consolidation at home, increasing confrontation with the West, and a radical “Look East” policy abroad. Even when Raisi and his Foreign Minister, Hossein Amir-Abdollahian, died in a helicopter crash on May 19, no one anticipated any surprises.
The Iranian political system, particularly the Office of the Supreme Leader and the Guardian Council, showed no signs of changing their strategy of “engineering elections” to maintain conservative control over the executive branch. Moreover, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei had publicly praised Raisi’s policies and called for their continuation. This made the election of Masoud Pezeshkian a surprise to many.
Pezeshkian, supported by “Iran’s Reformist Front” from the start of his campaign, has acknowledged the president’s limited power in determining or changing the country’s strategic policies. Despite this, he promised during his campaign to make adjustments within the existing policy frameworks. He emphasised the revival of diplomatic processes with the West, the reinstatement of the JCPOA, and efforts to lift sanctions. Pezeshkian argued, “With sanctions, one can perhaps survive; but one cannot progress.” He also stressed the need to de-escalate tensions with the West: “We seek good relations with Europe based on mutual respect and equality. The lack of political relations with the United States should not lead to costly tensions and conflict.”
Pezeshkian argued, “With sanctions, one can perhaps survive; but one cannot progress.”
Besides, the support of Mohammad Javad Zarif, the former Foreign Minister and a key architect of the JCPOA, for Pezeshkian, has raised cautious hopes for changes in Iran’s foreign policy, especially regarding the West and the nuclear agreement. However, the question remains: how realistic are these expectations of changes in Iran’s foreign policy?
A New Message to the World?
On July 12, Masoud Pezeshkian outlined the principles of his foreign policy in an English-language article published in the state-affiliated Tehran Times. Pezeshkian stated that his administration “will pursue an opportunity-driven policy” aimed at “creating balance in relations with all countries.” The article specifically highlights the new administration’s desire to enhance relations with neighboring countries and the Global South. Pezeshkian also refers to Russia as a “valued strategic ally” and advocates for “collaborating more extensively” with China.
However, Pezeshkian’s tone towards the West remains a familiar mix of warnings and historical grievances typical of Islamic Republic officials. He criticises the United States for withdrawing from the JCPOA and Europe for failing to ensure Iran reaped the promised benefits of the agreement, while reiterating that “Iran’s defense doctrine does not include nuclear weapons.” Essentially, the article conveys that any improvement in relations must begin with the West taking the first step. This piece, which some have labeled as Pezeshkian’s “foreign policy manifesto,” suggests continuity rather than change. Similar points were made in acting foreign minister Ali Bagheri Kani in an interview with Newsweek published on July 16th, in which he said it was the turn of Western countries to open a new chapter and prove they were interested in honest interactions.
The principles Pezeshkian mentions—from prioritising relations with neighbors to partnerships with Russia and China and active participation in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and BRICS—mirror those pursued by Raisi’s administration over the past three years. This has not gone unnoticed by domestic observers and has sparked criticism.
For instance, Hamid Aboutalebi, a political advisor to former President Hassan Rouhani, describes Pezeshkian’s article as “a confused, unprioritised, dreamy, incoherent image with lots of generalities.” He questions Pezeshkian: “If [as you say], European countries have violated all their commitments but unreasonably expect Iran to unilaterally adhere to all its commitments under the JCPOA, how are you prepared to hold constructive dialogues with European countries?”
However, Mohammad-Kazem Sajjadpour, a former senior diplomat currently serving as a professor at the Foreign Ministry’s School of International Relations, believes the main message of Pezeshkian’s article is “balance and equilibrium.” He posits that Pezeshkian’s foreign policy will be a “combination of continuity and change.” Sajjadpour comments on Pezeshkian’s approach to relations with Europe, noting: “Europe has its own issues… Never in post-World War II Europe has faced so many specific geopolitical and internal challenges… So, we are not dealing with a unified Europe.” According to Sajjadpour, Pezeshkian’s message is that Iran is ready to improve relations with Europe, but this depends on “how much Europeans can reach a reasonable perspective and not refer their internal issues to foreign affairs” and engage with Tehran with a unified approach.
Meanwhile, some interpret Pezeshkian’s article as a willingness to engage, but with an emphasis on Iran’s strong position. Zeinab Esmaeili, a journalist, argues in Khabar Online that Pezeshkian “seeks engagement with the world [but] considers this achievable with an emphasis on Iran’s strong position.”
Challenges Ahead
Even if the new president of Iran considers engagement the cornerstone of his foreign policy, numerous internal and external challenges could hinder his efforts. These challenges are particularly evident in the realm of nuclear diplomacy and efforts to revive the JCPOA. Aref Dehghandar, an international affairs analyst, highlights some of these challenges in an article in the reformist newspaper Etemad: “The current conditions of the international system and the Middle East bear no resemblance to the period when the nuclear agreement was signed in 2015. [In the United States], Biden currently has little chance of winning the election, and the likelihood of Trump’s return is very high.” He asks: “What is the new administration’s strategy for dealing with a Republican administration? Does the new administration intend to reach a temporary agreement with Biden in the four-month opportunity or will it wait for the outcome of the US elections to be determined?”
Similarly, internal opposition could disrupt Pezeshkian’s foreign policy plans. Ali Shariati, a member of Iran’s Chamber of Commerce, states, “One of the major problems facing Pezeshkian is internal issues, and the shadow government can obstruct his work.” He also points out that corruption, particularly the economic benefits of sanctions to some corrupt networks, motivates them to prevent the success of diplomatic efforts and the lifting of sanctions. It’s worth noting that Saeed Jalili, Pezeshkian’s hardline rival in the recent election, claims to lead a “shadow government” that has plans for various domestic and foreign policy issues. Currently, the majority of Iran’s parliament is controlled by conservatives and hardliners, especially Jalili’s allies. This could pose a serious obstacle to Pezeshkian’s plans both domestically and internationally.
In any case, for now, we must wait and see what practical steps Pezeshkian will take to revive diplomacy with the West after his inauguration. Naturally, it will be easier to assess policies based on practical actions rather than statements and campaign promises
The European Leadership Network itself as an institution holds no formal policy positions. The opinions articulated above represent the views of the authors rather than the European Leadership Network or its members. The ELN aims to encourage debates that will help develop Europe’s capacity to address the pressing foreign, defence, and security policy challenges of our time, to further its charitable purposes.
Image: By Mehr News Agency, CC BY 4.0, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=149640963
