On September 10th, around 20 unarmed Russian Gerbera drones entered Polish airspace. Poland shot down three, with the backing of fighter jets scrambled by other European NATO Allies. This marked the first direct military engagement by a member state during Russia’s war against Ukraine.
However, the threat and response were unevenly matched. Multi-million-dollar capabilities, including missiles fired from Patriot air defence systems and F-35s, were used to intercept drones worth no more than $10,000 USD each. As incursions continue to proliferate, NATO must quickly find more affordable ways to respond. Otherwise, European Allies risk depleting their entire arsenals, leaving them unable to deter a sustained Russian threat.
Europe’s initial response
After the September drone incursion, Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk activated Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty. Following Alliance-wide security consultations, NATO launched Operation Eastern Sentry, a new multi-domain mission that increased Integrated Air and Missile Defence (IAMD) capabilities across the Eastern Flank. At the same time, member states began discussing the need to build a European “drone wall” to counter future Russian airspace violations. Counter-unmanned aircraft systems (C-UAS) are a weak spot in NATO’s current European air defence posture. In particular, member states along the frontline with Russia lack the capabilities to create anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) zones over their airspace.
In her 2025 State of the Union speech to the European Commission, Commission President Ursula von der Leyen announced that the European Union (EU) would build the proposed drone wall. This European Drone Defence Initiative (EDDI) would function as the first stage of a multi-layered continental air defence system. Systems used by each EU member state as part of the final network would be expected to be interoperable with each other and those of other NATO Allies.
As incursions continue to proliferate, NATO must quickly find more affordable ways to respond. Otherwise, European Allies risk depleting their entire arsenals, leaving them unable to deter a sustained Russian threat. Gabriella Calder
Assessing its limitations
Under its current EU framing, the drone wall project would be too broad and costly in scope to meet the key priorities outlined above. Implementing the first configuration by its early 2026 deadline would require joint defence funding and procurement at a level unseen in the EU prior. The EU is not a military alliance. As a result, it lacks the centralisation necessary to coordinate multinational battle networks in the way that NATO is already explicitly designed to under the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR).
The most localised deterrence plans already in place along the Eastern Flank have so far been the most effective. Both Poland’s Eastern Shield and the pan-Baltic Defence Line work within the limitations of their geography and current national capabilities. However, they can be scaled to augment Eastern Sentry or other regional NATO A2/AD strategies in the future. Any initial configuration of the European drone wall should prioritise acquiring C-UAS for Eastern Flank countries first.
Learning from Ukraine
Beyond faster procurement, the cost asymmetry Allies faced when intercepting the Gerbera drone fleet over Poland made clear the need to also prioritise acquisition of more cost-effective systems. NATO should look to Ukraine as a model for achieving this goal.
Since 2024, Russia has scaled up its production of inexpensive kamikaze bomber drones, such as the Gerberas and Iranian-made Shaheds. The Russian army is now able to launch hundreds of drones at targets across Ukraine nightly. Low-cost production cycles have made it easy to replenish stocks on an ongoing basis. At the same time, the sheer scale of their use has made it impractical for Ukraine to counter each with traditional, high-cost missile-based air defences.
Beyond faster procurement, the cost asymmetry Allies faced when intercepting the Gerbera drone fleet over Poland made clear the need to also prioritise acquisition of more cost-effective systems. NATO should look to Ukraine as a model for achieving this goal. Gabriella Calder
Ukraine has been required to develop and inexpensively produce high quantities of interceptor drones to respond more effectively to the repeated attacks. Domestic defence technology firms and their military partners have had to adapt quickly. Each new development in Ukraine’s ability to create A2/AD zones has led to a cyclical evolution of Russian capabilities to evade and overwhelm these defences.
Despite this, Ukraine is now able to down 70-80% of nightly Russian attacks. Development of stronger defences is still ongoing. In early November 2025, Ukraine implemented and operationalised a domestic version of the European drone wall concept. Built by French defence technology company Atreyd, it consists of radar-triggered first-person view (FPV) drones that detect and intercept Russian drones. The system utilises AI when airborne to best configure the wall to neutralise incoming threats, and can be operated autonomously or remotely. Interceptors used by the Atreyd system cost no more than a few thousand dollars each and can be reused if launched but not detonated.
Cost-effective counter-solutions
How should Atreyd-style C-UAS be replicated to protect strategically vulnerable areas across the Eastern Flank? As one possible solution, the United States Army Europe and Africa (USAREUR-AF) command has pioneered a new initiative called the Eastern Flank Deterrence Line (EDFL). The EDFL aims to enhance NATO’s regional deterrence posture through system interoperability with other Allied initiatives, such as Eastern Sentry and Eastern Shield.
A C-UAS called “Merops” has become integral to the EDFL’s first stage. Produced by American defence startup Project Eagle, Merops has already been battlefield-tested in Ukraine. As of November 2025, the Ukrainian armed forces have successfully employed it to down over 1,000 Shahed drones, achieving a 95% success rate. Now, frontline NATO member states Poland and Romania are training under American soldiers to use the system. Merops uses $15,000 Surveyor drones as airborne interceptors, making it far cheaper to produce for repeated use than comparably-priced Russian kamikaze bomber drones.
Future adaptation
European states are understandably wary of increasing their security dependence on an unpredictable U.S. administration. In the new U.S. National Security Strategy (NSS), the EU, rather than Russia, is framed as the key hindrance to ending the current hostilities in Ukraine. Following any settlement in the war, the Trump administration plans to “mitigate the risk of [further] conflict between Russia and European states,” while reestablishing “strategic stability” with Russia.
At the same time, the quick embrace of the Merops system by Eastern Flank Allies has made it clear that they want to acquire cheap gap-filler capabilities now. Currently, the U.S. is the only transatlantic power capable of producing and circulating these capabilities at the pace necessary to match the current threat level Europe faces. As such, NATO SACEUR and USAREUR-AF should continue to work in tandem to facilitate its adoption by member states in the region. As more neighbouring states field MEROPS and other interoperable systems, they will form a full, multi-layered drone wall that protects NATO’s frontline. Ultimately, benefitting from American training now will prepare them to shoulder the burden of continental defence more independently in the future, regardless of future U.S. policy towards Russia.
The European Leadership Network itself as an institution holds no formal policy positions. The opinions articulated above represent the views of the authors rather than the European Leadership Network or its members. The ELN aims to encourage debates that will help develop Europe’s capacity to address the pressing foreign, defence, and security policy challenges of our time, to further its charitable purposes.
Image credit: Wikimedia Commons / ArmyInform
