On 24th September 2024, Russian President Vladimir Putin announced significant updates to Russia’s nuclear doctrine in response to what Moscow perceives as increased Western interference in Ukraine. A few months later, on Tuesday 19th November, Putin formalised the changes as official policy of the Russian Federation.  

The revised doctrine, titled “Fundamentals of State Policy of the Russian Federation in the Field of Nuclear Deterrence”, N°991, expands Russia’s conditions for nuclear weapon use. Moscow is now prepared to use nuclear weapons in retaliation to nuclear attacks, as well as conventional attacks that threaten the sovereignty or territorial integrity of Russia or Belarus. The policy shift from the 2020 doctrine is evident, as the previous stance also allowed for a nuclear response to conventional weapon attacks, but only under circumstances where “the very existence of the state is threatened.”  

Notably, the policy explicitly extends Russia’s nuclear protection to Belarus, framing this as a commitment under the Union State agreement between the two nations. In 1999, Moscow and Minsk signed the Union State treaty, which outlined cooperation across various areas, including defence, while preserving the independence of both nations. Moscow’s extended deterrence guarantee to Belarus is logical, given that Belarusian leader Alexander Lukashenko had permitted Russian-controlled tactical nuclear weapons to be stationed in Belarus, a move that was downplayed by some in the West as “purely a political message”. 

In addition, Paragraph 10 of the revised doctrine states that: “The aggression by any state from a military coalition (bloc, alliance) against the Russian Federation and (or) its allies shall be considered as aggression by this coalition (bloc, alliance) as a whole”. This line tacitly references NATO, emphasising that any aggression against Russia by a member of a military bloc or coalition is seen as aggression by the entire bloc. Furthermore, Paragraph 11 specifies that: “Aggression against the Russian Federation and (or) its allies by any non-nuclear state with the participation or support of a nuclear state shall be considered as their joint attack”. According to the doctrine, this qualifies as grounds for nuclear retaliation. However, it remains unclear whom such retaliation would target.  

What’s pushed Putin to implement these changes and, in so doing, lower the nuclear threshold? In a nutshell, it’s a consequence of the cautionary tale of “the boy who cried wolf” — in this case, Putin’s overreliance on the use of nuclear threats to induce Western caution — with the West’s knack for strategically sidestepping Russia’s red lines in Ukraine.  

Since the outbreak of the war, Putin’s repeated nuclear sabre-rattling demonstrates bluff and bluster, and the Western powers have shown they can carefully walk the line without crossing it, at least in Moscow’s eyes. Although the US initially took Putin’s nuclear threats seriously — “this is not a bluff” — Putin’ use of nuclear intimidation has received mixed results. The West has managed a delicate balancing act by combining various initiatives ranging from communication with Russia via intelligence channels, providing targeted economic aid, and supplying Kyiv with increasingly advanced weaponry, such as the Anglo-French Storm Shadow cruise missile for Russian targets within Ukraine, and F-16 fighter jets.  

This approach creates a core challenge for Putin; while Russia’s nuclear deterrent prevents direct NATO involvement, it doesn’t stop the West from operating just below this threshold. Through these calibrated moves, Western allies continually test Russia’s red lines, gradually eroding the credibility and effectiveness of Moscow’s deterrence without triggering a direct confrontation. This slow but steady erosion of red lines by the West places Russia in a difficult position, as each step subtly undercuts its strategic leverage over Ukraine and undermines the effectiveness of its deterrent. 

But what does Russia’s revised nuclear doctrine and the looming threat of escalation reveal about how Putin views nuclear weapons? During the Cold War, the leaders of the US and Russia mostly held the view that nuclear weapons offered no real political or military edge against an adversary with secure second-strike capabilities. Beginning with the outbreak of the war, Putin shifted this paradigm by wielding nuclear weapons as tools of coercion, aiming to manipulate shared nuclear risks for intimidation and political leverage. In his view, nuclear threats serve as instruments of deterrence and psychological warfare, calculated to pressure opponents while avoiding outright use. 

Although Putin’s nuclear threats have influenced the timing and nature of Western support for Ukraine, they have not fundamentally reshaped Western policies or deterred the ongoing expansion of aid. Instead, they underscore the limitations of nuclear coercion as a tool for shaping adversaries’ behaviour, highlighting its inherent bluntness and lack of precision in achieving political and strategic outcomes. 

Putin’s initial announcement on doctrinal changes was also timed to coincide with discussions at the United Nations, where Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky was pressing for permission to use advanced Western-supplied weaponry against high-value targets deep inside Russian territory. Zelensky’s appeal reflects a strategic shift, as Ukraine seeks not only to defend its own territories but also to weaken Russia’s capacity for continued aggression by targeting military infrastructure within Russia itself.  

With Zelensky’s request, western powers had to weigh the potential escalation risks against the benefits of allowing Ukraine broader operational freedom. In this context, Putin’s 24th September announcement served as a counter-warning, subtly reminding the UN and NATO members of the dangers of pushing Moscow’s red lines too far.  Yet, despite this warning, on 17th November the US approved Kyiv’s request for authorisation to use ATCMS missiles outside its own borders, and shortly after, the UK followed suit in lifting restrictions on Ukrainian use of British cruise Storm Shadow missiles on targets inside Russia.  

After Biden’s approval, Ukraine fired six ATACMS and Storm Shadow missiles into Russia, indicating that the US and UK both believed Putin was bluffing in his 24th September statement, which warned that aggression against Russia by a non-nuclear state, if supported by or involving a nuclear state, would be treated as a joint attack on the Russian Federation and could provoke a nuclear response. 

But why has the US decided to push against Russia’s red lines? This could be down to the fact that President-elect Trump has repeatedly expressed dissatisfaction with continued US military and economic support for Ukraine, arguing that it does not align with US national interests. Throughout his campaign, Trump claimed he would end the conflict on the first day of his presidency. Without meaningful US backing, the West would face significant challenges in marshalling resources to support Ukraine, which would cede military advantages to Russia. Paradoxically, while this decreases the likelihood of Putin escalating the war through nuclear means, it significantly increases the risk of Ukraine losing more territory to Russia.  

With a countdown of less than two months before an incoming Trump administration, the Biden administration is essentially signalling to Ukraine that it will support its efforts to retain the small portion of Russian territory it currently holds, to use it as a significant bargaining chip in potential future negotiations. 

In response, Putin formalised Russia’s revised nuclear doctrine “in a timely manner,” doubling down on his position to underscore the seriousness of Russia’s political and military boundaries while seeking to deter further Western military involvement without provoking direct confrontation. Following this, Putin retaliated by launching a nuclear-capable experimental ballistic missile with a range of several thousand kilometres against the Ukrainian city of Dnipro. This signalled a warning to Kyiv’s allies: a broader conflict may loom unless the West adjusts its policy.  

Despite Putin’s readiness to escalate through advanced weaponry, Moscow’s decision to notify the US Threat Reduction Center, only 30 minutes prior, clearly aimed to prevent misinterpretation and mitigate the risk of immediate nuclear escalation. This reflects Putin’s recognition of the dangers of miscalculation and unintended escalation, highlighting his intent to avoid inadvertently triggering a nuclear war. 

However, the possibility of Putin escalating with the use of low-yield nuclear weapons on the battlefield cannot be entirely ruled out. Although unlikely, such a decision might come as a nuclear warning shot over a remote area in Ukraine if Putin perceives an imminent threat to his regime or, as stated in the revised doctrine, the “sovereignty and/or territorial integrity” of Russia and Belarus is at stake. Yet, the term “sovereignty” in the revised doctrine is deliberately ambiguous and could be interpreted to include regime security. This mirrors the vagueness of Russia’s earlier 2020 doctrine, which permits nuclear use if “the very existence of the state is threatened.”  

Putin’s use of studied ambiguity — lack of specificity — is a deliberate tactic aimed at sowing doubt in the minds of his adversaries. Whilst the use of ambiguity in nuclear doctrine is not unique to Russia and is employed by other nuclear-armed states, Putin’s application stands apart due to its context, as it is tailored specifically to an ongoing war and is therefore formulated broadly to avoid a firm commitment to use nuclear weapons and keep Putin’s options open.  

Finally, any use of nuclear weapons by Russia would risk triggering retaliation in kind and could fundamentally shift the war’s dynamics by drawing NATO into the conflict—an outcome contrary to Putin’s interests. Currently, Russia holds conventional military superiority over Ukraine, a position that would be undermined if NATO were to intervene directly and fight alongside Ukraine. 

The European Leadership Network itself as an institution holds no formal policy positions. The opinions articulated above represent the views of the authors rather than the European Leadership Network or its members. The ELN aims to encourage debates that will help develop Europe’s capacity to address the pressing foreign, defence, and security policy challenges of our time, to further its charitable purposes.

Image credit: Russian Government / Alamy Stock Photo