The Western Balkans is a region of profound geopolitical significance, shaped by its historical legacy of conflict, shifting alliances, and aspirations for integration into both the European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). Despite official EU aspirations, public opinion across the region remains deeply fragmented. A survey conducted by the International Republican Institute (IRI) offers a vital snapshot of how public perceptions of alliances and threats are evolving. The poll also reveals that while some Western Balkan states lean towards the West, others —most notably Serbia—continue to align with Russia and China. Moreover, the prevalence of anti-Western propaganda, particularly through Serbian and Russian media, has further complicated efforts to foster a pro-European consensus. These findings underscore the geopolitical challenges facing the region and highlight the need for a more strategic Western approach.
Perceptions of allies
In the Western Balkans, ally preferences reveal major regional divides, reflecting both historical ties as well as more recent geopolitical calculations.
Albanians resoundingly designate the United States as their foremost ally, with a commanding 56% endorsement, followed by Italy and Turkey. Meanwhile, Bosnians pivot towards Turkey as their primary ally, with 22% backing, trailed by Serbia (16%) and Russia (13%).
Notably, Serbians themselves extol Russia as their paramount ally, securing a resolute 46% support, while China (14%) and Hungary (4%) follow suit. Consequently, more than six out of ten Serbians prefer totalitarian or authoritarian allies.
Despite official EU aspirations, public opinion across the region remains deeply fragmented. Dr Leon Hartwell
In stark contrast, Kosovars overwhelmingly embrace the United States as their chief ally, commanding a staggering 80% support, while Albania and Germany trailing.
In Montenegro, the landscape diverges as Serbia emerges as the principal ally with a substantial 32% support, followed closely by the United States at 20% and Russia at 9%. Macedonians similarly lean towards Serbia as the preeminent ally, with 34% support, followed by the United States and Turkey at 17% and 12%, respectively.
These findings underscore a complex geopolitical dynamic where the United States, Russia, Serbia, and Turkey wield significant influence over public sentiment in the Balkans. Still, equally noteworthy is the conspicuous absence of EU member states in the calculus of alliance preferences, despite major investments that have benefitted the Western Balkans.
Primary threats
Across the Balkans, the identification of primary threats often intertwines with perceptions of primary allies, thereby highlighting geopolitical divisions.
In Albania, over a third of respondents view Serbia as the foremost threat, while another third points to Russia. Bosnians are heavily divided as Serbia emerges as the primary concern for 27% of respondents, closely trailed by the United States (20%) and Russia (15%).
As for Kosovo, tensions with Serbia loom large, with 83% of respondents identifying it as the primary threat, underscoring the enduring discord between the two states. Russia was identified by 8% of Kosovars as the primary threat.
As for Serbians, 36% view the United States as the primary threat, followed by Albania at 18% and Kosovo at 10%. Interestingly, in Montenegro, despite its NATO membership, nearly one-fifth of respondents perceive the United States as the primary threat, while a similar portion view Russia in the same light, reflecting the country’s deep divisions over the country’s alliances.
Meanwhile, in North Macedonia, Bulgaria emerges as the primary foreign threat for over a quarter of respondents, a sentiment likely fuelled by historical tensions and Bulgaria’s recent impediments to the country’s EU aspirations.
A deep dive
Delving further into the attitudes towards key actors, the United States evokes a divided response within the region. While the majority of Serbians (75%) harbour unfavourable views towards the United States, overwhelming favourability is observed among Kosovars (95%), Albanians (92%), and a notable segment of Bosnians (53%). Conversely, Montenegro and North Macedonia exhibit polarised attitudes, with approximately only half the population of each country expressing favourable views of the United States.
Russia, a pivotal player in the region, similarly evokes a spectrum of sentiments. While the majority of Kosovars (89%), Albanians (85%), and Bosnians (57%) hold explicitly unfavourable views about Russia, Serbia emerges as a stronghold of support for Russia, with nearly nine out of ten expressing favour. Significant segments of the population in Montenegro (55%) and North Macedonia (50%), both NATO allies, also express favourable views towards Russia.
These findings underscore a complex geopolitical dynamic where the United States, Russia, Serbia, and Turkey wield significant influence over public sentiment in the Balkans. Dr Leon Hartwell
China, an emerging actor in the Western Balkans, elicits varying degrees of favourable sentiments among Serbians (88%), Montenegrins (66%), and Macedonians (56%). Nearly eight of ten Kosovars harbour unfavourable views toward China, reflecting the perception of China as a strategic ally to Kosovo’s main rival in the region, Serbia.
Germany enjoys widespread favourability across the region, particularly among Kosovars, Albanians, Bosnians, Macedonians, and Montenegrins. However, Serbia presents a divided stance, with almost equal proportions expressing favourable and unfavourable views towards Germany. As for Turkey, it enjoys notable support throughout the Balkans, most notably in Kosovo (88%) and Albania (84%).
Key takeaways and implications
All Western Balkan states officially aspire to join the EU. However, the IRI poll reveals significant divisions in their geopolitical outlooks. While Albania, Kosovo, and, to a lesser extent, Bosnia and Herzegovina lean strongly towards Western alliances, Serbia aligns more firmly with Russia and China. NATO members North Macedonia and Montenegro present a more complex picture, where substantial pro-Western sentiments coexist with significant segments of the population favouring authoritarian regimes.
Negative perceptions of the West are particularly pronounced in Serbia, but also in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, and North Macedonia. Some would argue that it may be because they perceive EU accession as an allusive and unachievable goal. However, and arguably more importantly, a substantial portion of their populations remains vulnerable to anti-Western propaganda, largely due to continued exposure to Serbian media—especially outlets like Radio Television Serbia (RTS), Pink TV, and Blic—as well as Russian propaganda outlets, including Sputnik and Russia Today, which promote anti-Western narratives.
The ongoing protests in Serbia following the tragic train station disaster in Novi Sad highlight these tensions. Serbia’s increasingly authoritarian president, Aleksandar Vučić, under intense scrutiny, has blamed Western actors and foreign intelligence services for attempting to orchestrate a colour revolution. Yet, the West’s response to these developments has been conspicuously silent, raising questions about its commitment to countering authoritarian narratives and supporting democratic movements in the region.
These negative perceptions captured by the IRI poll are crucial, not because they solely dictate the foreign policy of Western Balkan states, but because they significantly influence it, particularly regarding EU or NATO participation. For example, if these states join the EU, their divergent outlooks will further complicate consensus-building and could weaken the supranational structure. Serbia in the EU, with its strong negative attitudes towards the U.S. – traditionally, the most important European ally – and favourable views of Russia and China, strategic rivals of the EU, could further strain relations between Washington and Brussels and act as a Trojan Horse for Beijing and Moscow’s influence within the EU.
As the region advances toward European integration, complete alignment with the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) must be a firm condition well before EU membership is granted. Serbia’s current alignment stands at a mere 51%. Given the EU’s substantial financial leverage, it must use its resources to incentivise compliance and penalise divergence from its strategic policies. Moreover, the continued susceptibility of Balkan audiences to anti-Western propaganda underscores the need for a more robust Western engagement strategy. Countering these narratives is essential, not just for the stability of the region, but for the integrity of the EU and NATO as a whole.
The European Leadership Network itself as an institution holds no formal policy positions. The opinions articulated above represent the views of the authors rather than the European Leadership Network or its members. The ELN aims to encourage debates that will help develop Europe’s capacity to address the pressing foreign, defence, and security policy challenges of our time, to further its charitable purposes.
Image credit: Wikimedia Commons / Voice of America
