In his speech to this year’s Munich Security Conference, French President Emmanuel Macron observed, in the context of the war in Ukraine, that “we will have to define rules of coexistence that limit the risk of escalation after a future ceasefire”.

It is hard to disagree with the good sense of that statement. Russia’s full-scale invasion has been the final nail in the coffin for any shared rules of conduct between Moscow and NATO, leaving only the exercise of raw – and increasingly unstable – deterrence in its wake.

But what are the chances of Russia and the rest of Europe agreeing on any rules at all in the aftermath of the war’s bitterness? How should the two sides think about defining “rules of co-existence”? Where might any such rule-setting begin?

Current discussion of the “rules” or “guiding principles” that should shape Europe’s future security remains dominated by the traditional frameworks of the past: the Helsinki Final Act, the NATO-Russia Founding Act (NRFA), Russia’s emphasis on the “indivisibility of security”, and the behavioural agreements enshrined in the OSCE’s Vienna Document.

Such rules are, of course, fundamental to stable security anywhere in the modern world, and it is vital that any eventual framework for Russia-Europe relations should embody and promote them.

But we are not there yet – not even close.

Europe perceives Russia as having comprehensively violated both the Helsinki principles and the NRFA. Moscow, in turn, has convinced itself of European bad faith, for example over NATO expansion. It deeply distrusts many of these principles, viewing them as a Western trap that led to Gorbachev’s alleged “sell-out” of Soviet interests in Europe and has constrained Russia ever since. Following the 2014 annexation of Crimea, the Russian approach has increasingly hardened into “new rules or no rules”.

The disbelief and distrust that these perceived offences engender will take years – perhaps decades – of engagement, confidence building, and politico-military cultural transformation to overcome. Russia and the West did not succeed in this transformation between 1991 and 2014, and there is little reason to expect a faster process now, even after a stabilising settlement in Ukraine.

So instead of focusing on “substance principles”, we should develop and insist upon a set of “process principles” to guide Russia-Europe relations: rules of the road that both sides can respect at every stage of the relationship’s evolution, but which are especially vital in the “first-gear” phase we now face – one defined by the slow, painstaking management of confrontation and the reduction of escalation risks.  Such principles are likely to be both easier to agree and more urgently needed at the outset of any renewed dialogue.

What “process principles” might Russia and other European states realistically be able to agree upon in the foreseeable future, presumably in the wake of a Ukraine settlement? I suggest six. Each could be implemented unilaterally, but all would be strengthened through mutual agreement – and each could be deepened if conditions evolve favourably:

1. Time. There should be a shared recognition that the confrontation between Russia and Europe is not static but will evolve over time. This awareness could help both sides see that they retain agency – that they can influence the trajectory for good or ill – and that the confrontation is better managed than left to drift. Analysts often frame European security in five- or 10-year horizons. But it would be a mistake to ignore longer timelines. Few expect anything but continued confrontation over the next decade; over 25 years, however, better outcomes may yet be possible.
2. Journey. Closely related to this temporal perspective should be an acceptance that attempting to define an end-state would be deeply divisive, and therefore counterproductive. The focus should instead be on managing the journey rather than prescribing a destination. Static metaphors – such as “European security architecture” – should give way to more evolutionary concepts, such as the development and health of a “European security ecosystem.”
3. Vision. Even so, a sense of direction matters. It may remain impossible for some time for Russia and Europe to agree on a shared characterisation of ideal future relations. We are far from notions such as “a common European home” or “a Europe whole, free, and at peace”. Even a “managed co-existence” may be too ambitious for now. But it may still be possible for Russians and Europeans to agree that, over time, a shared goal should emerge. In the interim, more modest shared objectives could take shape, beginning with “escalation avoidance” and, perhaps, gradually moving toward “co-existence”. Without some degree of foresight, states risk failing to take short-term steps they may later wish they had taken.
4. Respect. Mutual respect for each other’s states and alliances – including the EU, NATO, and the Collective Treaty Organization (CSTO) – would provide an essential baseline. We may oppose each other’s leaderships, abhor each other’s behaviours, seek to undermine each other’s policies, and dispute each other’s borders. But we should not seek each other’s disintegration. Over time, this could foster a grudging recognition that the stability of the other side’s state and alliances is, on balance, preferable to the alternatives.
5. No surprises. Mutual respect requires sustained, confidential dialogue. Both sides need channels through which they can communicate concerns, objections, and red lines, so that even when actions are unwelcome, they are not unexpected. Such predictability forms both the foundation for, and probably the near-term limit of, agreement on classic stabilising principles, including transparency and accountability.
6. Doors. Finally, states should avoid foreclosing long-term possibilities in pursuit of short-term imperatives. Where choices arise in deterrence and defence policy, both sides should favour options that preserve the widest possible range of future pathways in the relationship. The extent to which each side is willing to do so could itself become a subject of dialogue under the “no surprises” principle.

There are, no doubt, many other “process principles” worth identifying and debating. But these six already provide a rich and productive starting point for any initial Russia-Europe security dialogue – one focused on limiting the risk of escalation and, over time, enabling a more stable and managed coexistence.

The European Leadership Network itself as an institution holds no formal policy positions. The opinions articulated above represent the views of the authors rather than the European Leadership Network or its members. The ELN aims to encourage debates that will help develop Europe’s capacity to address the pressing foreign, defence, and security policy challenges of our time, to further its charitable purposes.

Image credit: Adrien Vautier / Le Pictorium