Masoud Pezeshkian’s victory in Iran’s July presidential elections gained little attention or enthusiasm in Israel. The elections took place amid the Israel-Hamas war in Gaza following the Hamas-led attack on Israel on 7 October attack last year. It is Israel’s longest war. Israel has also been involved in a simultaneous war against Hezbollah, which started after the latter’s unilateral attack on 8 October and has escalated significantly in recent weeks. These conflicts, coupled with the ongoing hostage crisis, have taken up most of the news cycle in Israel.
How Pezeshkian’s presidency is viewed in Israel
In many of the relatively few post-Iranian election reports published in Israel, focus was placed on Pezeshkian’s plans to improve Iran’s relations with the international community, especially the West. These reports also mentioned that Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, and his conservative supporters would be the main obstacles to Pezeshkian fulfilling this goal, given that the supreme leader has far more authority than the president in Iran.
The consensus in Israel is that Pezeshkian is unlikely to have much power or influence. Meir Javedanfar
The consensus in Israel is that Pezeshkian is unlikely to have much power or influence. In an article published on 6th July in the centre-left Israeli daily newspaper Yediot Ahronot, Iran expert Dr Raz Zimmt argued that, like Iran’s previous presidents, much of the power will remain in the hands of the supreme leader and the regime (i.e. The Deep State). “Past experience proves that presidents who tried to introduce notable change were limited, inhibited and neutralized [by The Deep State]”, added Dr Zimmt.
In an article published on the same day in the conservative-leaning Israeli daily Yisrael Hayom, Middle East expert Oded Granot cast doubt on Pezeshkian’s ability to change Iran’s domestic and foreign policy. Similarly, Granot attributed this to the fact that much of the power remains in the hands of the Deep State with the Supreme Leader Khamenei at its helm. Granot argued that another factor likely to hinder Pezeshkian is the low turnout in the elections, which shows a lack of legitimacy of the Islamic Republic among the Iranian public. The only relatively optimistic assessment about Pezeshkian’s victory came from one of Israel’s financial newspapers, Calcalist. In an article published on 6th July, Doron Peskin wrote that due to Iran’s significant economic challenges, Pezeshkian will likely make a concerted effort to resolve them. However, he, too, argued that the new president is likely to face challenges from the conservative institutions and individuals at the helm of the Iranian regime.
Peseshkian’s view on Israel
During his election campaign, Pezeshkian spoke little about Israel. He focused on other issues, primarily domestic ones.
But soon after his election victory, he started expressing support for Israel’s most ardent enemies in the region. Two days after his win, Israeli press reported that Pezeshkian messaged Hezbollah chief Nasrallah stating that opposition to Israel would be one of the central themes of his government’s policies. He also promised continued support to Hezbollah against Israel.
Then, on 23rd July, he informed the leadership of the militant group Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) – designated a terrorist organisation by the US, UK, and the EU – that the people of Iran support the goals of Palestinians. Among those, Pezeshkian stated were “freedom of the holy Quds [i.e. from Israel] and the destruction of the Zionist regime”.
Perhaps the most symbolic indication of Pezeshkian’s intense hostility towards Israel was the invitation of Hamas’ then-leader Ismail Haniyeh to his inauguration ceremony in Iran’s parliament. To Israelis, Haniyeh, alongside Yahya Sinawar, are responsible for the 7 October attack, the biggest massacre of Jews since the Holocaust. During the ceremony, Pezeshkian and other Iranian politicians warmly received and welcomed Haniyeh. To Israelis, the Pezeshkian administration was their new enemy in Tehran.
It is possible that Pezeshkian adopted a stronger anti-Israeli position after the election because he needed the supreme leader’s support. Iran’s new president is well aware that without Khamenei’s support, his candidacy would not have been approved by the powerful Guardian Council.
Everyone in Iran, including the regime-censored press, knows about and has discussed the phenomenon of mohandesi entekhabat (election engineering). One aspect of this manipulation entails modifying election results to suit the interests of Iran’s Deep State, headed by Supreme Leader Khamenei. After winning the election, Pezeshkian publicly thanked the supreme leader. “If it was not for him, I don’t imagine that my name would have emerged from the ballot box [as the winner]”, added Pezeshkian.
Despite some occasional more moderate public statements regarding Israel and reports that he was against a direct Iranian retaliation against Israel after the assassination of Haniyeh, for Israel, Pezeshkian remains subservient to the supreme leader. The same was true of Iranian presidents before him, such as Iran’s former reformist President Mohammad Khatami (1997-2005) and moderate Hassan Rouhani (2013 – 2021). Both men wanted to reduce tensions with Israel as a means of enabling them to improve relations with the West and develop Iran’s economy. Still, they were both thwarted by the supreme leader’s unbending animosity towards Israel.
Pezeshkian’s rejectionist stance on Israel means that he is likely to fail in fulfilling his promise to improve Iran’s economy, which desperately needs foreign investment. According to Pezeshkian’s own assessment, most Iranians invest their capital abroad instead of at home, and for the economy to grow, Iran needs $100 billion in foreign investment. The people of Iran face constant power outages, rising inflation, and a collapse in their purchasing power.
Potential impact on a nuclear deal
In the post-7 October world, the Iranian leadership’s policy towards Israel makes the job of reaching a new nuclear deal with the US more difficult. Any US president, including Donald Trump, would have difficulty justifying a nuclear deal with a regime that trained the perpetrators of the 7 October massacre, especially given that many of the victims and hostages were US citizens. On 10 October, in reference to the 7 October attack, while denying their direct involvement, Iran’s supreme leader publicly praised the planners of the massacre: “We kiss the foreheads and arms of the resourceful and intelligent designers of the Palestinian youth.”
In the post-7 October world, the Iranian leadership’s policy towards Israel makes the job of reaching a new nuclear deal with the US more difficult. Meir Javedanfar
Even if there is to be a nuclear deal, investment in Iran is likely to be very small because of Iran’s continued support for Western-designated terror groups, such as Hamas and Hezbollah.
Unlike other Iranian politicians such as Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, Hassan Rouhani, and Ali Larijani, Masoud Pezeshkian did not enter office with his own network of supporters within the regime. As a result, he has few options and little chance of getting anything done without the supreme leader’s support. Because of the supreme leader’s Israel policies, Pezeshkian’s efforts to improve Iran’s economy and, with it, the regime’s legitimacy are unlikely to get very far.
The European Leadership Network itself as an institution holds no formal policy positions. The opinions articulated above represent the views of the authors rather than the European Leadership Network or its members. The ELN aims to encourage debates that will help develop Europe’s capacity to address the pressing foreign, defence, and security policy challenges of our time, to further its charitable purposes.
Image: UPI / Alamy Stock Photo
