On Monday, April 7, US President Donald Trump, during a meeting with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, announced the beginning of direct, high-level diplomatic talks between Tehran and Washington, set to commence on Saturday, April 12. The announcement came as a surprise—not only to observers and analysts but apparently even to Netanyahu. He had hoped his visit to Washington would secure stronger US backing for a tougher stance on Iran, particularly support for potential military action against Tehran’s nuclear program.
Indeed, despite the announcement of talks, Trump and other senior US officials continue to emphasise that the military option remains on the table. An unprecedented US military buildup in the region has further fueled concerns about possible armed conflict with Iran. Yet, the decision to open negotiations has sparked cautious optimism—hope that diplomacy may finally break the deadlock between Iran and the United States and prevent a war that could engulf the entire Middle East.
Why location and format matter
Initial reactions from the Iranian side suggested that the Islamic Republic officials likely did not expect the talks to be made public before they began—especially with President Trump emphasising that the diplomatic engagement would be direct. Iranian officials, including Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, quickly confirmed Trump’s statement that negotiations would start on Saturday. However, they insisted that the talks would be indirect.
News of the planned US–Iran talks emerged following a letter Trump sent to Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. Unlike during Trump’s first term, this time Tehran responded. While the US message was delivered via the United Arab Emirates, Iran’s reply was sent through Oman. It soon became clear that Oman would host the talks on April 12, with Araghchi representing Iran and Steve Witkoff, Trump’s special envoy for Middle East affairs, representing the United States. Oman has long served as a trusted intermediary between Tehran and Washington. In 2011, it hosted the secret talks that ultimately paved the way for the 2015 nuclear agreement, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).
In this context, the Iranian news outlet Khabar Online explained Tehran’s choice of Oman over the UAE, citing “Oman’s long and successful track record in mediation, its neutrality, independent foreign policy, and its historic, trust-based relationship with Iran.” By contrast, it noted Iran’s “deep mistrust of the UAE due to its ties with Israel, its limited and unreliable mediation history, and certain internal political and strategic considerations.”
Beyond the choice of venue, the format of the talks has been a contentious issue within Iran—especially because just two months earlier, Ayatollah Khamenei had publicly ruled out negotiations with the United States, declaring such talks “neither wise, nor intelligent, nor honorable.” This created an immediate challenge for Iranian officials: how to reconcile the regime’s participation in the negotiations—particularly after Trump publicly disclosed them—with Khamenei’s earlier stance.
In this light, Iranian officials’ repeated insistence that the talks are indirect appears to be a strategic move. It suggests that Khamenei has likely shifted his position under mounting internal pressures and growing external threats. Ultimately, no decision involving engagement with the US—even indirect—can proceed without his approval. Thus, framing the negotiations as indirect serves as a face-saving measure, allowing the Iranian government to preserve consistency with Khamenei’s earlier statements while adjusting to the evolving geopolitical reality.
Framing the negotiations as indirect serves as a face-saving measure, allowing the Iranian government to preserve consistency with Khamenei’s earlier statements while adjusting to the evolving geopolitical reality. Hamidreza Azizi
Recent statements by Iranian officials suggest that a fundamental decision has been made to engage in negotiations with the United States—regardless of the format. Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, for instance, has downplayed the importance of whether talks are direct or indirect, stating that what truly matters is whether the US demonstrates a “genuine will” to reach an agreement.
In a notable development, Araghchi published an article in The Washington Post in which he referenced the possibility of economic cooperation and US investment in Iran—an apparent attempt to make a potential deal more appealing to Trump. President Masoud Pezeshkian went even further, asserting that Ayatollah Khamenei has approved economic engagement with the United States. According to Pezeshkian, Khamenei “has no objection to American investors investing in Iran.” If accurate, this statement is significant, as many believe that a key shortcoming of the original JCPOA—and one reason behind Trump’s 2018 withdrawal—was the lack of tangible economic benefits for the US.
At the same time, some media outlets aligned with the Iranian government have sought to minimise the significance of the April 12 talks, likely in an effort to avoid any perceived contradiction with Khamenei’s earlier positions. For instance, Fars News Agency, affiliated with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), described the negotiations as a preliminary step to “gauge intentions” rather than substantive talks.
Other voices within Iran have argued that Khamenei has always been open to expert consultations and that the decision to pursue diplomacy came after careful analysis of Trump’s letter and the identification of a potentially viable opening. They emphasise that Iran’s approach aims to avoid giving Trump an excuse to blame Tehran for a diplomatic breakdown and to deflect domestic and international pressure.
In any case, the developments and official rhetoric of recent weeks point to a serious willingness within Iran to explore diplomacy with the United States. In a rare signal, even senior military figures—such as Maj. Gen. Mohammad Hossein Bagheri, Chief of Staff of Iran’s Armed Forces—have publicly expressed openness to diplomatic engagement.
What do experts say?
Iran’s currency market was the first to respond positively to news of the upcoming negotiations. Within just two days, the Iranian rial appreciated by 7% against the US dollar. Analysts suggest that if a deal is successfully reached, the rial could strengthen by as much as 30%.
Several former diplomats have also welcomed the prospect of renewed dialogue between Tehran and Washington, describing it in op-eds and interviews as a hopeful sign.
Hossein Adeli, former Iranian ambassador to Canada, Japan, and the UK, called negotiations with the US “a wise move” that reflects “the will of the people.” At the same time, he warned that certain actors—both domestic and foreign—are invested in the failure of the talks and are actively working to undermine them. “We must neutralize these efforts before the talks begin,” he emphasised. Adeli also underlined the importance of a measured, reciprocal approach to the negotiations.
Hamidreza Asefi, former Foreign Ministry spokesperson and ambassador to France, echoed a similar sentiment: “If the Islamic Republic concludes that the other side is honest and genuinely wants to resolve the problem, a positive outcome can be achieved.” However, he made it clear that Tehran would not entertain discussions on its missile program or defensive capabilities.
Kourosh Ahmadi, a former Iranian diplomat in New York, described the current moment as the “last opportunity” for Iran and the US to reach an agreement and avert war. He noted the looming expiration of the JCPOA’s “sunset clauses” and the threat of the snapback mechanism being triggered, warning that the window for diplomacy is rapidly closing. “Hardline factions in Israel and the Israeli lobby in the US are waiting for an opportunity to derail the negotiations,” he cautioned.
Javid Ghorban Oghli, former Iranian ambassador to South Africa, described Tehran’s decision to negotiate with Trump as both “bold and wise.” He argued that, “if managed correctly, wisely, and intelligently,” the talks could mark a turning point in the Islamic Republic’s political trajectory and significantly enhance Iran’s regional and international standing.
Despite the positive reactions from parts of Iran’s political and expert community, there is far from a consensus across the political spectrum on negotiating with the US. Hamidreza Azizi
Despite the positive reactions from parts of Iran’s political and expert community, there is far from a consensus across the political spectrum on negotiating with the United States. In particular, the ultra-hardline camp—represented in parliament by the Stability Front (Jebhe-ye Paydari)—remains staunchly opposed to any form of engagement, whether direct or indirect.
Mohammadreza Sobhaghian, a member of parliament, warns against repeating “the same mistake twice” by trusting the US again. In his view, the core of the conflict goes beyond nuclear or military issues; he believes the United States fundamentally opposes the very nature of the Islamic Republic.
Amirhossein Sabeti, another hardline MP and a close ally of former nuclear negotiator Saeed Jalili, echoes that sentiment. He dismisses the negotiations as nothing more than a tactic for “playing the people,” suggesting they are meant to create a false sense of progress.
Beyond these explicit political objections, some expert-level discourse on social media reflects a more nuanced scepticism—though not always outright opposition. Some commentators argue that Trump’s motive may be to use negotiations as a distraction, buying time to prepare for military action—either by the US or by Israel. In support of this theory, they cite the example of former US envoy Amos Hochstein, who is blamed for raising hopes for a deal with Hezbollah only for Israel to use the opportunity to strike Hezbollah’s leadership.
Others highlight Trump’s penchant for self-promotion and his disregard for discretion, viewing his lack of confidentiality as a serious liability to the success of any negotiations.
The case for cautious optimism
Overall, commentary within Iran reflects a sense of cautious optimism regarding the launch of negotiations with the Trump administration. Given the fraught history—from Trump’s withdrawal from the JCPOA to his order to assassinate Qassem Soleimani, the former commander of the IRGC’s Quds Force—Tehran’s willingness to engage suggests a pragmatic shift. This shift appears grounded in a recognition of Iran’s military and economic constraints, and a desire to avoid war while securing relief from crippling sanctions.
Given the fraught history—from Trump’s withdrawal from the JCPOA to his order to assassinate Qassem Soleimani, the former commander of the IRGC’s Quds Force—Tehran’s willingness to engage suggests a pragmatic shift. Hamidreza Azizi
This pragmatic approach seems to be gaining broader acceptance across much of Iran’s political spectrum. Aside from a small segment of the ultra-hardline camp, most factions—even those traditionally sceptical of the United States—do not fundamentally reject diplomacy. This may signal a rare opportunity to pursue a deal that addresses concerns over Iran’s nuclear program while averting another regional conflict.
Still, this is only the beginning. Serious challenges lie ahead—both domestic, in the US and Iran, and external—and the potential for miscalculation remains high, especially amid the ongoing military buildup on both sides. A single misstep could derail the fragile diplomatic process and reignite tensions.
The European Leadership Network itself as an institution holds no formal policy positions. The opinions articulated above represent the views of the authors rather than the European Leadership Network or its members. The ELN aims to encourage debates that will help develop Europe’s capacity to address the pressing foreign, defence, and security policy challenges of our time, to further its charitable purposes.
Image credit: Pacific Press Media Production Corp. / Alamy Stock Photo
